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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter: Does
going to prison increase the chance that one eventually applies for U.S.
disability insurance (DI)? Since the 1980’s, there have been substan-
tial increases in both the number of people who have been incarcerated
and the number of people applying for DI. Both increases have caused
higher costs to taxpayers. While several studies have explored the
causes of the increased DI applications and several others have looked
at the labor outcomes of ex-inmates, no study has yet asked whether
prison itself has any effect on the DI application process. Prison, with
its harsh conditions, could cause physical and mental disabilities that
increase the chance of a DI application. Properly measuring this, how-
ever, requires considering any endogeneity that predisposes ex-inmates
to a DI application prior to incarceration. To do this, I use the instru-
ments of states’ minimum wages and legal high school drop-out ages
to explore the effect of increasing incarceration numbers on state-level
DI applications. I find that prison does have a significant effect on DI
applications; a 1.0% increase in incarceration causes approximately a
0.5% increase in DI applications six years after the initial increase in
incarceration numbers. I find that prison’s effect is especially strong for
a means-tested group who also concurrently applies to Supplemental
Security Income (SSI); here a 1.0% increase in prison leads to a 0.9%
increase in people who apply for both DI and SSI after a six year lag.
This suggests lower income groups are more sensitive to incarceration.
Also, the cost of imprisonment should take into account the cost of
subsequent DI applications and awards.
The second chapter: This paper assesses the specific case of when
a monopolist manufacturer producing two types of goods is allowed
to bundle the goods when selling to retailers who are allowed to re-
sell the goods individually, have territorial market power and have
heterogeneity in the resale demand functions. While the literature
covers bundling in a variety of forms, no paper has considered the ef-
fect that the presence of multiple retailers may have on an upstream
manufacturer who bundles and how benefits to bundling may accrue
to consumers, retailers, and manufacturer in the presence of retailer
heterogeneity. It is shown that under plausible circumstances, the abil-
ity of a retailer to retain profit in the face of bundling may prevent
consumers in other markets from realizing greater welfare-enhancing
effects although bundling in these cases at least weakly improves con-
sumer welfare and never diminishes it. It is also shown by example,
that in the case of three retailers, some retailers may actually profit
more when the upstream manufacturer bundles while other retailers
may profit less. This suggests that in certain cases some retailers may
even favor upstream bundling as their interests align with that of the
manufacturer.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Incarceration on
Disability Insurance Applications
1.1 Introduction
The mid-1980s saw the beginnings of significant U.S. policy changes in the
seemingly distinct realms of disability insurance and criminal justice. These policy
changes led to a substantial increase in both the number of people incarcerated in
prisons and the number of people applying for and receiving Disability Insurance
(DI) awards. Numbers for DI increased from about 1,066,000 applications and
416,000 awards in 1985 to 2,935,000 applications and 1,049,000 awards in 2012.
These numbers greatly outstripped any increases in the working-age population
over this time frame; awards per 1000 insured workers increased from 3.7 in 1988
to 7.0 in 2010. Overall, there are about 8.8 million people collecting disability
insurance today compared with about 2.5 million in 1985. (Social Security Ad-
ministration data.) Meanwhile, the overall number of prisoners in the U.S. has
changed from approximately 600,000 in 1985 to just under 2.5 million in 2010.
The magnitude of the change is comparable to the rise in DI applications over
the same time-period. From 1984 to 1999 alone, the ratio of jailed persons to the
population changed from 96 per 100,000 to 468 per 100,000 (Pastore and Maguire,
1
2000).
Theories abound for the occurence of such changes. With respect to DI,
the federal government reduced the stringency with which applications for awards
were screened. The loosening of the criteria of who was eligible for DI benefits
led to increases in both the number of DI applications and awards in the subse-
quent decades. Autor and Duggan (2003) also cite the increased attractiveness of
benefits to low-skill workers, who found that the replacement rates offered by DI
awards rose relative to the falling real wages these workers faced. The changes
in the prison numbers have been explained by evolving attitudes towards crimi-
nal punishment, with tough sentences for drug-related offenses being a large factor.
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The literature is still considering all the causes leading to increased DI
awards and its resultant effects on the social welfare system and labor force partici-
pation. Another literature exists for exploring the effect of prison on the workforce
and labor outcomes for inmates. Little to no work exists, however, on the rela-
tionship between the two. Open questions include not only whether prisoners are
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more likely to apply for DI, but also whether prison itself, with its hard conditions,
can make someone suffering an incarceration spell more likely to become disabled
and apply for a DI award. In this paper I seek to tie together these questions.
First, I seek to determine some of the important factors driving DI applications.
Second, I also ask if the increase in prison spells are themselves responsible for
some of the rise in DI applications.
These are important policy questions. As the number of DI awards has grown
by millions, the size of the welfare state has also grown and become increasingly
costly to taxpayers. If the increase in prison numbers is responsible for a sizable
fraction of the DI award increase then one can say that the cost of incarceration
needs to be adjusted upward as well. A study of the factors that have lead to
greater DI applications (and subsequent DI awards) will help shape future policy
discussions about both the prison system and disability. In addition, these in-
creases accompany changing trends in the labor force participation rate and are
a small part of a larger empirical puzzle in the literature: the labor force partici-
pation rate, on the rise for decades because of women’s increasing entry into the
labor force, has now come back down in recent years to approximately where it
was in the late 1970’s. Labor force participation was 62.8 % in 1978 and had risen
to 66.2, 67.2, and 66.2 % in 1988, 1998, and 2008 respectively; in 2014 it was back
to its 1978 level. Since eligibility for DI requires removal from the labor force, one
may wonder to what extent the two phenomenon are linked. If prison has some
disabling effect on people to the point that they remove themselves from the work-
force, then prison policy is relevant for issues involving labor force participation.
However, the effect of prison spells on disability applications is difficult to
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determine as some prisoners likely have conditions that make them also likely to
apply for DI before any incarceration spell ever begins. For instance, prisoners
could have mental disorders that both make it difficult to obtain paid employment
and increase the tendency to commit crime. To disentangle the effect of prison it-
self on disability from the pre-dispositions towards DI that prisoners already have
requires careful analysis. In this paper I will use the instruments of minimum
wage and minimum school drop-out ages to address any endogenous factors caus-
ing disability that prisoners already have prior to going to jail. This is explained
later in the paper but to get a sense of how DI may be interconnected with the
prison experience, it is first useful to consider some demographic data showing
how the DI and prison populations overlap.
The groups most likely to apply for disability share some demographic char-
acterisitics. Autor and Duggan find that 47 percent of all DI applications come
from high school dropouts. Racial minority status, poverty, poor health, and lower
education also increase the probability of applying to DI, even when controlling for
other factors (Coe, Haverstick, Webb, and Munnell, 2011.) Interestingly, some of
these same racial, educational, and income characteristics also increase the prob-
ability of suffering spells of incarceration. From survey and panel data, Raphael
(2011) finds that 19 percent of blacks who were high-school dropouts were im-
prisoned versus only 5.0%, 4.1% and 2.3% for whites, Hispanics, and Asians,
respectively. For college graduates, the numbers drop: 1.1 % of blacks were incar-
cerated versus 0.2%, 0.1% and 0.4% for whites, Hispanics, and Asians, respectively.
Raphael also finds that the proportion of people who have spent time in prison
at any point has also increased in past decades. In 1974, 1.4% of whites, 8.7%
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of blacks, and 2.3% of Hispanics had prior spells in jail. By 2001, those numbers
had risen to 2.6%, 16.6% and 7.7%, respectively. Over ten million people in the
U.S. have had prior incarceration at some point in their lives. Raphael points
out that young men in certain demographics have been especially hard hit. More
than 20 percent of black men in both the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups have served
time, with the 35-44 group having the highest proportion of ex-inmates for every
ethnicity. (Raphael, 2011) Beck suggests the problem is acute for black and His-
panic males, with 11% and 4% of each group in prison at a single moment in time.
(Beck, 2000) Western and Pettit report that 33 % of black high school dropouts
were in jail in 2000. (Western and Pettit, 2000)
Lack of skills is a problem for many inmates upon their release. Even with the
advent of prison training programs, Raphael reports that 54% of released inmates
have less than a high school education or G.E.D. (Raphael, 2011) If one supposes
that lack of skills and job experience compound the stigma of a criminal record
in attempts to procure employment, it is not unreasonable to think that many
ex-prisoners are future candidates to disappear from the labor force. (Holzer,
Raphael and Stoll 2004) Since labor force non-participation is a prerequisite for
DI application, if many ex-prisoners can’t find jobs then they could have little to
lose by also applying for disability claims, whether such applications are successful
or not. The possibilty exists that prison leads to further DI applications through
this channel even if prison itself is not disabling.
Autor and Duggan (2006) mention that there are three primary reasons for
the sharp increase of DI awards in recent decades: reduced stringency of eligibility
criteria, higher replacement rates for some insured workers, and female participa-
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tion in the labor force. Autor and Duggan point out that eligibility criteria were
liberalized in the 1980s, perhaps as a result of politics or more sympathetic policy
managers at the state level. However, they indicate that not only did the number
of people deemed disabled increase within each type of disabling category, but also
that the relative proportions of awards across the categories began to significantly
vary. In 1983, 16.8% and 21.9% of all DI awards were given for neoplasms and
circulatory disorders, respectively; only 13.4% of awards were for musculo-skeletal
disorders and 16.3% were for mental disorders. By 1999, the same breakdown
looked like this: 10.6% for neoplasms, 12.1% for circulatory disorders, 23.7% for
musculo-skeletal disorders, and 22.5% for mental disorders. The new emphasis
switched the prior DI awards for more-lethal conditions to less-lethal ones: neo-
plasms and circulatory disorders had mortality rates exceeding 16% while mortal-
ity rates for musculo-skeletal conditions and mental disorders were on the order
of 5% per year over the same period. The trend of giving DI awards to less lethal
conditions has continued to the present day and does much to explain the increas-
ing rolls. Not only are more people applying and receiving awards, but they are
also staying on the rolls longer because the disabling condition is not fatal.
Of relevance for the formerly incarcerated population is the increase in a men-
tal disorder diagnosis as a reason to receive DI. She and Stapleton (2006) report
that "based on data from three Department of Justice (DOJ) surveys, about 37
percent of jail inmates, 31 percent of state prison inmates, and 23 percent of Fed-
eral prison inmates report a disability of some sort." They claim that this is about
evenly split between three types of self-reported disabilities: physical, mental, and
learning. Even if approximately 10 percent of jail inmates have mental disorders,
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and these disorders persist when inmates become ex-inmates, then the number of
ex-inmates with mental disorders is in the millions. This is a potentially sizable
fraction of all DI awardees. Considering the preponderance of ex-inmates in their
30s and 40s, the mental disorder disability issue becomes more acute when looking
at who, under 50 years old, is collecting DI. About 33% of male DI recipients are
"young" - or under 50, about 1.5 million people. For women, about 28% of DI
recipients are under age 50 and this amounts to just over 1 million people. 50%
of all DI recipients under age 50 receive their DI award as a result of a mental
disorder. This amounts to 1.25 million people. (Social Security Administration.)
If being in jail has an exacerbating effect on causing mental disorders or interferes
with proper psychological treatment, one can imagine then it could affect the DI
statistics.
Other factors may also be important for increased DI rolls. The "replacement
rate" used to determine DI awards is based on the past income of insurees. As
low-skilled workers have seen their real median incomes drop over the past few
decades relative to higher skilled workers, the incentive to apply to DI has in-
creased. Also, more females are eligible for DI simply because of their increased
participation in the workforce. Autor and Duggan (2003) cite higher mortality
rates, lower median wages of dropouts, and lower proportions of immigrants in
the population (who potentially tend to apply for DI awards less than natives) as
factors that can increase DI applications. They find the length of unemployment
insurance benefits to be insignificant as is the number of people incarcerated per
state, although they do not explicitly consider a time lag between the time when
jail ends and DI applications begin, treating those two phenonmenoa as simulta-
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neous.
Interestingly, in their later 2006 paper, Autor and Duggan find that, when
looking at the lowest 10th percentile income group, replacement rates increased
more for 30-39 year-old men (60.6% to 85.7 %) than for 50-61 year-old men (67.8%
to 86.0%) over the 1984-2002 time period. The percentage change in DI awards
has also been larger for 25-39 and 40-54 year old groups than for the 55-64 year
old group. Even though the older group still leads the DI awards in levels, the
younger groups have had the largest proportional change. The factors causing
these younger groups to apply to DI more frequently are still largely undeter-
mined.
Coe, Haverstick, Munnell and Webb (2011) examine whether there are differ-
ences between those who apply only for DI versus those who apply concurrently
for DI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). (SSI is a means-tested supple-
mental income program which does not require a concurrent application to DI.)
They look at state-level application data and find that factors such as race, labor
force participation rate, length of unemployment benefits, health insurance regu-
lation, and the prevalence of smoking matter for the DI-only group. For applying
to the means-tested SSI and non-means tested DI concurrently, health measures,
education-level, gender, mandated disability insurance through state law, and the
presence of a Republican governor matter. This study considers lots of variables,
however, and it is sometimes difficult to figure out which factors may be driving
disability claims, especially for the young population; the idea that labor force
participation and unemployment numbers, for instance, are related to disability
application may skew the results, as they are both conditional for application in
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the first place. Including these variables in a regression for DI applications is likely
a case of controlling for too many factors if we are to assess the other causes of
applying for DI.
Putting aside other causes for changes in DI applications, the question of in-
carceration’s effect on DI remains open. Most of the literature on labor patterns of
ex-inmates focuses on whether there is an employment participation effect or earn-
ings effect as a result of jail. There is virtually nothing on DI. The literature that
does exist reveals mixed results on the employment and earning patterns. Some
studies actually suggest a positive effect of incarceration on both employment and
earnings, but the bulk of the literature suggests a negative one. Kling (2006) uses
panel data on prisoners to assess the effect of longer prison sentences on earnings.
He uses randomly assigned judges, with different sentencing behavior, as an in-
strument and finds that longer incarceration spells are initially accompanied by
increases in employment and earnings for one to two years after release. How-
ever, he says these findings are also "largely explained by differences in offender
characteristics and incarceration conditions, such as participation in work-release
programs." He finds that any effect of longer prison sentences on employment or
earnings vanishes after seven to nine years. He also constrains his study to com-
pare only prisoners with shorter sentences with prisoners with longer sentences;
there is no non-prisoner control group. Cho and LaLonde (2008) find that women
who go to prison experience declining employment rates prior to going to prison
and experience a bump of up to 5% in employment and earnings immediately after
leaving prison, although again this generally dissipates to pre-prison levels after a
few years. They claim that prison has no long-term effect on subsequent earnings
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or employment.
Most studies indicate that jail has a subsequent negative employment effect,
beyond a positive or merely neutral one. Grogger (1996) uses data from the adult
criminal justice system in California and merges it with unemployment insurance
data from the early 1980’s. He looks up to six quarters after incarceration for the
employment and earnings effects. He finds negative effects on employment and
earnings, which are dampened somewhat by state fixed effects. Grogger, however,
has limitations with his data as some of the men might have returned to jail or
still be in jail in the "after" period. Geller, Garfinkel and Western (2006) do a
careful study in which they look at a panel of families, some of whom include
ex-inmates and some of whom do not. They use propensity score matching to
analyze the treatment of jail on similar groups. They find that employment rates
of formerly incarcerated men are about 6 percentage points lower than for similar
men who have not been incarcerated. They claim imprisonment is also associated
with a 14 to 26 percent decline in hourly wages. Western (2000) shows that the
age-earning profile of inmates is flat compared with men who have never experi-
enced jail. This gap grows with age. (The inference is that this contributes to
differences in replacement rates for any future DI applications.) Freeman (1992)
similarly finds that there is a 15-25% lower employment rate for those jailed when
looking at the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Waldfogel (1994)
finds that first-time conviction reduces employment probabities by 5 points and
has a significant negative effect on income - as much as 30 percent. He uses panel
data on federal offenders and estimates pre- and post- conviction income on age
and other covariates. However, Waldfogel admits unobserved heterogeneity can
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be a problem and that there is a need for better data. Lott (1992a) shows that
those convicted of embezzlement and large-scale fraud do much worse after prison
while, in a different paper, Lott (1992b) shows drug offenders experience little
change in their income after a prison spell. He rationalizes this by saying those
who did the best financially prior to prison have the most to lose and may suffer
the worst effects. Needels (1996), in a separate study, finds that there is no ef-
fect on employment from going to jail but did find a negative earnings effect of
12 percent. However, Needels primarily looks at people who were inmates in the
1970s and 1980s and their subsequent labor force participation in the 1980’s and
1990s. One wonders if the same results would hold up today given the changes in
the justice system in the last 30 years.
Given the different findings of the effect of incarceration on earnings and em-
ployment, one would expect that there would be even more theories to explain the
direction of the effect. Indeed there are and some of these theories also suggest
reasons for possible bias in jail’s effect on employment. To begin, the theories
that proclaim a positive effect on jail on earnings or employment often point to
things like training programs or education that inmates receive in prison. Tyler
and Kling (2007) find that attendance in a G.E.D. program leads to about a 15
percent increase in earnings for inmates upon immediate release but that the ef-
fect dissipates completely after several quarters. Using data on federal offenders,
Nagin and Waldfogel (1998) claim that ex-prisoners have less access to career jobs
offering stable, long-term employment. As a result, a criminal record often "rel-
egates offenders to spot-market jobs, which may have higher pay at the outset
of the career but do not offer...rising wages." This suggests that any gains in the
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labor market from prior prison experience are short-lived. On the other hand,
much has been written about reasons for the potentially detrimental effects of a
prison spell on employment. Waldfogel (1994) mentions the possibility of erod-
ing skills from incapcitation. Irwin and Austin (1997) mention the possibility of
encouraging behaviors that are inconsistent with positive workplace routines. Gra-
novetter (1995) discusses how a jail spell can cause social capital to be diminshed;
with fewer connections to the working world it can be hard to find a new job as
many jobs are found through social contacts. Haney (2002) mentions other factors
such as hypervigilance, interpersonal distrust, suspicion, emotional over-control,
alienation, psychological distancing, dependence on institutional structure, dimin-
shed sense of self-worth, physical trauma, and retraumatization of childhood/past
experiences can all have an effect on post-prison employment prospects. Liat Ben-
Moshe (2013) also notes that prison has "hard labor, toxic conditions, circulation of
drugs, unsanitary needles, poor air quality and lack of appropriate medical care."
This latter description moves perhaps closer to the realm of creating a nascent en-
vironment for directly disabling conditions, although clearly there is a continuum
of reasons why incarceration might not be helpful for worker productivity.
Some of the effects of prison on the labor force, and the resultant effect on DI
applications, may be even more nuanced. Western and McLanahan (2000) found
a low likelihood of marriage or cohabitation for ex-prisoners. Laub, Nagin and
Sampson (1998) find a higher rate of divorce for prior inmates. If spouses pool
resources, then it is possible a lower family income could affect the incentive to
apply for disability insurance and other entitlements. Garfinkel (2001) posits that
incarcerated men with children are often hopelessly in arrears with child support
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payments by the time they exit prison. This may diminish the incentive to work
as prisoners are able to keep less of their earnings and thereby induce them to
apply for DI. Using employer survey data, Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2007) make
the point that the stigma of having a criminal record or "rap sheet" alone might be
enough to dissuade potential employers from hiring. Pager (2003) found similar
results when sending out fake c.v.’s; those with c.v.’s that listed prison experience
rarely got callbacks for interviews. Becket and Western (1999) notice that many
inmates tend to come from the same neighborhoods in many states. For instance,
Baltimore is the origin of 50% of all state prisoners in Maryland and 7 New York
City neighborhoods account for 75% of state prisoners in New York. They claim
that this can often lead to stereotyping and that the stigma of coming from a
neighborhood where prisoners agglomerate could be used in place of a revealed
criminal record when making employment decisions. Such stereotyping would pre-
sumably bias the direct effect of prison on employment downward, but still result
in a greater indirect effect on employment for the larger population. This could
have increased ramifications for labor force non-participation and therefore for
disability insurance applications. Another source of potential bias when measur-
ing jail’s impact on DI is pointed out by Haney (2002.) He mentions that prisons
have become more overcrowded over time and conditions have potentially become
worse. This raises the possibility that the effect of prison on DI applications has
become greater in later years, if prison life itself generates disabilities. Of note also
is a paper by Conly (2005) which describes state agencies in New York, Pennsyl-
vania and Texas whose explicit purpose is to help ex-inmates apply for and obtain
DI benefits. The existence of such agencies suggests that a substantial portion of
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the ex-inmate population may be disabled.
Haney (2002) and She and Stapleton (2006) indicate that prisons may be fill-
ing the role of now nearly-extinct previous institutions like sanitariums in housing
large numbers of the mentally ill. This conjecture is consistent with the separate
trends of a large and growing number of people collecting disability insurance and
a large and growing number of people who have been incarcerated. Given that
many incarcerated individuals report potentially disabling conditions and that
prison itself may contribute to diminishing the ability to work, the time has come
for a more formal investigation of whether the two things are related.
This paper hopes to expand the understanding of factors driving changes in
applications for DI while also exploring the issues regarding the costs and ben-
efits of criminal justice policy in the spirit of Becker’s (1968) seminal paper on
crime and punishment. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section
II describes the regression approach used in assessing the effect of incarceration
effect on disability insurance applications, section III describes the data used by
the model, section IV describes the results, and section V concludes with some
policy implications.
1.2 Model
The principal equation to be estimated is:
DIAppsit = β0 + β1Prisonersit−q + βiXit + fi + uit
Here, DIAppsit is the number of federal disability insurance applications as
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a proportion of the eligible working age population in state i in year t. Prisonersit−q
is the number of prisoners per capita in state prisons in state i in year t−q. Xit is a
vector of covariates at the state level that also explain changes in disability insur-
ance applications. fi is a fixed effect at the state level which can explain persistent
differences in the screening and approval of disability insurance applications that
exist across states and thus explain some of the variation in the number of appli-
cations. uit represents unobserved variables that affect disability applications.
Estimation of β1, the effect of the lagged number of prisoners per capita on
the number of disability applications, is the focus of this paper. One would expect
that OLS estimation of the above equation to lead to biased estimates if some
of the unobserved conditions, such as mental disorders, that lead a person to a
prison spell also are likely to lead to eventual application for disability insurance.
If prison has simply become the latest place to house more people with prior men-
tal disorders then OLS estimates of β1 would be expected to show a very small
effect on disability claims.
To determine whether attendance in prison itself leads to additional (mental
or physical) disabilities that increase the chance of a disability application, the un-
derlying disablities that lead a person to a prison sentence must be disentangled
from the additional effect that incarceration itself has on disablity. To do this,
I adopt an instrumental variable approach in which the instruments show little
correlation with such underlying disabilities but still are correlated with additional
prison sentences. The following section explains my choice of instruments.
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1.2.1 Instruments
To estimate the effect of prisoners per capita on disability insurance, I use two
instruments that I assume satisfy the criteria of being uncorrelated with disabil-
ities in the population but correlated with incarceration numbers in each state.
These two instruments are minimum wage changes and minimum school drop out
ages. In addition to satisfying these two conditions for use as appropriate instru-
ments, I will also argue that these variables are also best used as instruments and
not as independent variables in the main regression.
To begin the argument that the minimum wage variable1 has a relationship
with incarceration, preliminary data suggests that there is a 0.2265 correlation
with minimum wage and prisoners per capita. Also, research by Beauchamp
and Chan (2012) shows that minimum wage increases have a significant effect
on crime. While the labor economics literature on the effects of minimum wage
on labor force participation and employment is inconclusive and a source of much
academic debate, Beauchamp and Chan suggest that a unemployment effect may
be pronounced for a sector of unskilled workers who have a proclivity to commit
crime.2 They find that a 1 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated
with a 2.1% to 2.4% increase in violent crime3, a 1.8% to 2.3% increase in prop-
erty crime and a 1.4% to 2.8% increase in juvenile drug crimes. As minimum
wage increases occur in jumps of more than one percent, they could generate
1State minimum wages are considered in this model in place of federal minimum wages, even
if the state levels fall below federal levels. Sub-federal minimum wages are applicable to sizable
groups such as tipped employees, young workers under 20 years of age with less than 90 days
job tenure, student-learners, workers in small businesses with little interstate commerce, and
(perhaps relevantly) workers with disabilities.
2Ahn, Arcidiacono and Wessels (2011) posit that minimum wage increases affect unskilled
workers employment prospects more than skilled workers. The thought is that unemployed,
unskilled workers could remain idle and commit more crimes.
3Violent crime increases were found concentrated among those crimes with a clear monetary
reward. 16
large increases in crime. These results are consistent with an older literature (
e.g. Hashimoto (1987)) that finds a positive effect of minimum wage on certain
categories of teenage crime.
In a different paper related to predicting juvenile crime, Chan (2012) also
posits that an “incapacitation effect" is responsible for the decrease in crime due
to exposing late adolescents to stricter high school drop-out laws.4 She uses varia-
tion in state minimum high-school drop-out ages to determine this. She finds that
increases in drop-out ages do have some effect on decreasing crime for those close
to high school graduation age although this effect dissipates through the mid-to-
late 20’s. My own data indicate a small negative correlation of 0.0257 between
minimum high-school drop-out age and incarceration.
These arguments pertain to the strength of the instruments and are bolstered
by Cragg-Donald statistics which are included in the results. Typically, a Cragg-
Donald F-statistic of 10 indicates sufficient strength of the instruments in the first
stage regressions. Values of 11 to 20 are obtained for most specifications in this
paper.
Besides instrument strength, instrument validity, which is lack of correlation
with the error term in the main regression, must be assessed. One argument here
is that minimum wage increases on their own should have no bearing on the the
amount of disability in the population. I assume that the minimum wage paid
to workers is completely independent of the level of disability such workers face.
Its argument for inclusion as an instrument is that wage increases can force an
4The “incapacitation effect" theory is that students and young adults do not commit crimes
close to the period when they are still in school but may still offend several years later upon
emancipation from stay-in-school laws. Forcing the students to physically remain in school
“incapacitates" them and removes them from the opportuntity to commit crimes outside of
school.
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employer to lay workers off in the face of rising costs. This, in turn can lead to
unemployment, idle time and increased risk of prison. Any resultant prison sen-
tence is more likely to have an effect on disability claims several years down the
road than the original minimum wage increase would.
One possible objection to this logic may be that any policy resulting in dis-
employment (such as potential minimum wage increases) will increase the hazard
of at least applying for disability insurance, because unemployment is a precondi-
tion for such application. This would indicate that minimum wage belongs in the
main regression and not as an instrument. To address this concern, I will argue
that while, in fairness, minimum wage changes may certainly have an immediate
effect on unemployment (and DI applications), this effect should not last for more
than a year or two and should not survive periods on the order of half a business
cycle (or approximately five years.) By the time four to six years have passed, any
direct effect minimum wage changes had on individual employment probablilties
should dissipate. Its effect on disability insurance applications, however, will still
show up several years later through the channel of prison. This is especially true
if prison spells last longer than the direct effect of minimum wage on employment
and also have themselves a potentially stronger effect on disability.
An argument can also be made for the validity of the mandatory school drop-
out age instrument. I will assume that increased mandatory school drop-out ages
are not done as a response to changes in the underlying distributions of disabilities
in the population but are due more to policies designed to meet the changing ed-
ucational needs of a workforce. The additional argument for proper identification
of mandatory school drop-out ages as an instrument for prison and not as a direct
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contributor itself to DI applications relies again on arguing that this policy has
little effect on the factors that lead to employment (and resultant DI-ineligiblity)
several years down the road. Ostensibly, the primary factor here that has the
most direct effect on both employment and DI application tendency is population
educational level. While it is fair to wonder whether mandatory school drop-out
ages have any effect on education level, two ideas suggest that it does not directly
matter this way in my regression. First, my data indicate a nearly zero but still
slightly negative correlation of −0.0011 between the mandatory minimum drop-
out age and the percent of the population with a high school degree; thus, forcing
students to stay in school longer has no obvious effect on educational outcomes
in this data set. Second, I will directly control for the percent of the population
with a high school degree in the other covariates in my regression. This last part
should help isolate any “incapacitation" effect that keeping students in school for
longer periods has on prison numbers apart from the actual educational outcome
of such a policy.
Sargan tests are performed to test the validity of the instruments. The Sar-
gan test works only with overidentification and assumes that at least some of the
instruments are valid before testing whether the additional instruments have any
correlation with the error terms in the main regression. Accordingly, the above
arguments for identification are necessary. Still, the Sargan test can be used as
a robustness check on instrument validity given the conditional assumption that
at least some of the variables have proper identification as instruments. Starting
with a null hypothesis of valid instruments, a chi-square statistic is reported. p-
values for these Sargan numbers much larger than 0.1, and often very close to 1,
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were routinely found in a variety of specifications and are reported in this paper.
This gives further support to the suitability of the two variables as suitable in-
struments. The rest of this section discusses the suitability of the other variables
in the model.
1.2.2 Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable in the paper involves applications for disability
insurance at the state level. Through use of a special data set, I consider different
kinds of categories here. It is possible to consider the number of people who apply
only for DI separately from the number of people who concurrently apply for both
DI and the means-tested Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.5 Using
this convenient variation in data, it is possible to determine the effects of certain
variables on overall DI applications as well as the effect of the variables on the
two subgroups. This is useful in assessing whether incarceration or other variables
have differing effects on the two populations, as those without a low income cannot
apply for the means-tested SSI and may potentially have other different underlying
characteristics as well.
1.2.3 Use of Fixed Effects
There is considerable variation in the number of prisoners per capita in each
state, from 0.069% to 0.873%. Clearly, states may have different attitudes about
5I am grateful to Paul Davies of the Social Security Administration for providing the Title 2
(DI) only, Title 16 (SSI) only, and concurrent Title 2 and Title 16 receipts by state for FY1993-
FY2010. The FY1993-FY2000 receipts data came from paper records from SSA’s State Agency
Operations Reports (SAOR) system. The FY2001-FY2010 receipts data are from SSA’s Payment
Management System (PMS). I am also grateful for Boston College’s Center for Retirement
Research for providing me with a table form of these data at the state level.
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crime and punishment. States may also have different attitudes about awarding
disability insurance claims. If successful awards also lead to a preponderance of
additional applications, some of the large variation in DI application numbers
across states may be a result of different within-state cultures, some of which may
have a more permissive attitude towards entitlements than others. The actual
awarding of DI benefits is largely determined within-state so much of the variation
in application numbers could be endogenous. To account for built-in cultural
differences across states in both justice system outcomes and disability insurance
administration, I propose a fixed effects approach and use binary variables to
control for each state’s individual history and attitudes towards the factors leading
to DI applications. I then regress the DI applications against the fixed effects,
incarceration measures and other relevant variables. The goal is to see whether
changes in prison policy or other variables lead to within-state changes in disability
applications.
1.2.4 Other Covariates
Since the literature suggests that other variables are also a factor in disabil-
ity applications, I run my regressions on different specifications. To control for
health variables, I include mortality rates and the proportion of people in each
state with a BMI at an overweight level or higher. I control for age by including
the proportion of the working population (aged 18-64) over age 50. I consider
educational status through the proportion of workers who have obtained at least
a high school education. To assess the impact of race and ethnicity, I include the
percentage of the population classified as white and I also include a measure of
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the number of foreign-born people in each state to test Autor and Duggan’s claim
that immigrants apply for DI less than natives do. I include the percent mar-
ried in each state as a variable to partly control for family dynamics and possible
self-insurance through marriage. I also include an indicator variable if there is a
Republican governor in the state to assess changing cultural norms and bureau-
cratic changes that affect the chances of a DI application, which may itself be
affected by the chance of an application being successful. I chose not to include
variables with little explanatory power or those that cause collinearity issues. La-
bor force participation, for instance, was left out as non-participation is highly
correlated with DI application and some of the other variables. As it is a neces-
sary condition for any DI award, I found labor force participation absorbed much
of the explanatory power of the other variables when included. The goal of my
regression is to find which variables cause an increase in DI applications overall
and not simply find the effect of each variable on DI applications conditioned on
non-participation in the labor force.
1.2.5 Use of Lags for Prisoners Per Capita
It is reasonable to wonder how soon after leaving prison that ex-inmates begin
applying for disability benefits. It is expected that most inmates try to enter the
workforce upon release, although it is unclear how long most inmates expect to
remain in the work force if they are repeatedly unsuccessful at procuring employ-
ment. Clearly, the application for disability benefits may not be instantaneous
upon release in most cases. To account for a possible lag between release from
prison and application for disability benefits, I regress DI applications on state
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incarceration numbers on anywhere from two years prior to nine years prior. The
identification arguments made earlier suggest that some of the instruments may
have an effect on the main equation during some of the early lags. Once this effect
has dissipated, the principal effect of the instruments on the DI channel should
come through the prison channel. Raphael (2011) indicates average prison spell
lengths for various categories of offense for both 1984 and 2002. Robbery, for
instance, had an average sentence of 3.13 years in 1984 and 3.80 years in 2002.
Other statistics for average prison sentence length in the two periods include av-
erages for assault (2.01 and 2.86 years), burglary (1.99 and 2.48 years), drugs
(1.63 and 2.11 years), motor vehicle violations (1.42 and 1.87 years), rape (2.98
years and 5.30 years), and murder (6.49 years and 8.13 years.) The more violent
crimes have longer sentences but tend to be less frequent. The median sentence
is currently on the order of a little over three years, although this also reflects a
several month increase from earlier decades. Given these numbers and the time it
may take to remove oneself from the workforce after a prison spell, I would expect
prison to have the largest effect on DI applications approximately four to six years
after the beginning of incarceration. The extent to which prison spells affect DI
applications in even longer lags is unclear but I explore them in accordance with
the reasonable limits that the data allow.
1.2.6 Other notes
In this paper, the instruments themselves are concurrent with the lag of the
prison variable which they are used to predict. I explored the possibility that
prison should be instrumented using lags of the instruments since some time may
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pass before any changes in minimum wage or school drop-out ages result in new
crimes. However, I found that the concurrent instruments were the strongest and
most valid according to the Cragg-Donald and Sargan numbers respectively; thus
I use these instruments instead of lagged ones.
As an additional robustness check, logs of both the dependent and indepen-
dent variables are used in the main regressions. This allows more direct calculation
of elasticities. I consider the appropriateness of the log model using the instru-
mental variables approach in the results section.
Errors are assumed to be i.i.d. This allows calculation of the p-values for
the Sargan tests and allows the Cragg-Donald statistics to be related to critical
values calculated by Stock and Yogo (2006). Heteroskedastic robust errors did not
change the estimated coefficients and variances appreciably.
1.3 Data
My model can be estimated through the use of a combination of data sets. In-
formation on DI-only and DI-SSI concurrent applications at the state level came
from a data set provided by the Social Security Administration and obtained
through the Center for Retirement Research (CRR) at Boston College. The CRR
also aggregated and provided many relevant state-level demographic variables.
The main variables of interest are disability application rates by state (from 1994
to 2007), expressed as a percentage of the state’s working-age population (ages
18-64) not receiving DI benefits.6 Similar to Coe, Haverstick, Munnell and Webb
6The denominator is the number of residents aged 18-64 in a state as of July 1st from the
U.S. Census Bureau. From this I subtract out the number of beneficiaries of each program,
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(2011), I consider what factors explain the variation in application rates to DI and
also the two components of this overall application rate - the DI-only application
rate and the concurrent DI-SSI application rate.
Data on incarceration numbers come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’
website. I was able to obtain the numbers of incarcerated individuals in each
state prison system from 1988-2012. This allowed me to regress disability insur-
ance applications on prisoners from several years prior. I did not consider the
number of federal prisoners in each state as these prisoners may come from dif-
ferent states. Approximately 10 percent of prisoners are federal prisoners. I did
not have data on which states federal prisoners come from, but I assume that the
states are somewhat uniform in the percentage of the population each contributes
to the federal system, so I do not expect exclusion of the federal prison numbers to
bias the results. Also, some states house prisoners from other states in their state
prisons or in out-of-state for-profit prisons. Data on interstate prison transfers
is scarce but one study by Kirby (2013) found that interstate prisoners currently
number about 10,500. Since this is a small number compared to the total number
of prisoners currently held in state prisons or jails (approximately 2,500,000), I
also do not expect the lack of data on interstate prison transfers to bias the re-
sults. In addition, Kirby suggests that interstate prison transfer is a more recent
phenonomenon of the past few years. Therefore, the lack of this interstate prison
transfer data should not affect much of the 1988-2009 time period of my study.
The District of Columbia is excluded from the regression as D.C. began plac-
ing its prison population in other states (mainly Virginia and North Carolina) in
obtained from the Social Security Administration Statistical Bulletins (SSA 1994-2009) since
current beneficiaries are not at risk of applying.
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1998 and completed the process in 2001. Interestingly, the District of Columbia is
also mostly urban. It has a much higher prisoner per capita measure prior to 1999
than all other states, and almost twice as high as the next closest state, Texas.
Whether the results would be different by including this urban outlier is an open
question, but the incomplete data precludes estimation.
To assess BMI levels in each state - and the percent of the population deemed
as overweight - I use the Center for Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance Survey (BRFSS). This a telephone-based survey that has been in
place since 1984 and interviews about 350,000 people per year. To control for
declining land-line usage that may accompany telephone surveys, I use the CRR’s
weights for land-line usage in each state. The proportion of residents in each state
who are in each age group, who are white and not Hispanic, who are married,
and who have at least a high school diploma comes from the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement found in the Current Population Survey (March CPS) and
the tables that the CRR aggregated using this survey. Political variables regarding
the presence of a Republican governor come from the National Governors Associ-
ation’s Governors Database and the Council of State Governments’ The Book of
the States and also were aggregated in tables used by the CRR.
In addition, separate information on state-level mortality rates was compiled
using the Center for Disease Control’s website. Statistics on immigration were
obtained through the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Homeland Se-
curity. To construct a measure of the number of foreign-born people in each state,
I used the Census data in 1990 and 2000 to obtain the number of foreign-born peo-
ple living in each state at the end of each decade. I then obtained the number of
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persons obtaining "legal permanent resident status" by state of residence from the
Department of Homeland Security’s website in each year from 1990 to 2009. Then,
for each year in the sample I added the cumulative total of legal residents entering
the state since the start of the relevant decade (either 1990s or 2000’s) to the
number of foreign-born immigrants listed in the census for that state at the start
of the decade. This allowed me to construct a measure of foreign-born people in
each state for each year. The cumulative numbers of legal residents entering each
state throughout a decade closely matched the overall increase in census-reported
foreign-born population across the decades in most states, so I presume this is a
reasonable way of constructing the number of foreign-born people in each state
for all years. Also, unless there is evidence of significant movement of immigrants
obtaining residence in one state and then moving to another state, I do not expect
much mismeasurement or bias here. In any case, such evidence is hard to come
by.
The instruments used to predict incarcerated individuals per capita in each
state were obtained as follows: state-level minimum wage data comes directly from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) website. Data on minimum legal school
drop-out ages for the various years and states is from Oreopoulous (2009).
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Overall Results
The main dependent and independent variables (DI applications and pris-
oners) in the linear regressions are expressed as percentages of the working age
population. A dummy variable is used to indicate a Republican governor. The
other demographic variables which are percentages are percentages of the entire
population and not just the working age population due to limitations on data.
With the other variables, a one unit change represents a change from no one in
the population having the indicated characteristic to everyone having said char-
acteristic. Accordingly, the coefficients mainly represent the proportional change
in disability insurance application if everyone undertook the listed characteristics
as opposed to no one. It is not expected that these effects would be linear for the
entire population but the coefficients serve to give us a sense of changes at the
margin. A coefficient of "1" approximately means a one percent increase in the X
variable is accompanied by a one percent change in disability applications. Besides
this model where the percentages were inserted into the regression linearly, logs
of the percentages are also considered to determine if changing the specification
matters in the determination of the elasticities.
The main coefficient of interest is the one measuring the effect of lagged pris-
oners per capita on disability applications. When included without instrumental
variables (but with the other listed covariates) against the combined (both SSI
& DI as well as DI-only) categories of DI applications in a regression, the effect
of the prison variable is found to range from small but negative and significant
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values (-0.2 for the earliest lag) to small but increasingly positive and significant
values for the later lags (such as 0.3 for the nine year lag.) It seems that, even
when uninstrumented, prison spells are correlated with some effect on disability
insurance 7 to 9 years down the road.
When the instruments are used, the effect increases positively for all lags and
is substantial in both magnitude and significance. The coefficient on prison is
maximized at a lag of approximately five to six years and suggests that a given in-
crease in the number of prisoners per capita accounts for twice as many disability
applications six years later. The effect is still strong nine years out (0.6 applica-
tions per prisoner) but weaker and insignificant two years out (0.3 applications
per prisoner.)
The instruments appear to be correcting for some downward bias. On the
one hand, if prison is simply correlated with people who already exhibit disability
and many of these people have been shifted to prisons over the past few decades,
the rise in prison numbers may not be responsible for a drastic change in DI ap-
plications. On the other hand, prison is itself disabling, then the instruments,
which are chosen to be independent of any pre-prison disabling features in the
population, should show the disabling effect of prison. The fact that disability
insurance applications increase with prison spells, while controlling for prior levels
of population disability, suggests that prison itself elevates the hazard of eventu-
ally applying for DI several years after the initial incarceration.
If the effect is strong and significant, one can still wonder if the numbers
listed here make sense. How can one additional prisoner lead to more than one
additional disability application? It may be that prison affects not only the incar-
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cerated individual but also his or her acquaintances. Prison splits up families and
forces those who are not in prison to make ends meet on one less income and to
raise children with one less spouse. It causes stress for other people who know the
prisoner and it’s conceivable that this could lead to further disabling conditions.
There could also be neighborhood effects a la Becket and Western in which people
who merely live in high crime districts have difficulty finding work because of the
bad reputations of those areas; they may drop out of the labor force as a result.
Such effects could be persistent and have labor effects down the road. That said,
the coefficient of "2" on the five year lag does still seem somewhat inexplicably
high but nevertheless points to a strong effect of prison on overall DI-applications.
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Graph 2: Effect on DI Apps by Prisoners per Capita sorted by lag time
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It may be that a log specification does better at prediciting the results
than the linear model. One problem with the log model is that the instruments are
somewhat weak for the early lag specifications (suggesting a misspecified model
perhaps due to lack of variation with the log variables or better correlation be-
tween instruments and prison in later periods) but recover enough to be useful
for lags of five years or more. If one focuses on the five year and six year lag
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period, where the instruments are suitably strong and valid, the effect of prison
on DI is positive and significant. An elasticity of approximately 0.5 is reported
here, which is more realistic than the linear coefficients. Again, a downward bias
seems to be corrected from the uninstrumented case, which actually had prison
showing a small but negative and significant elasticity of -0.09 in the five year lag
specification.
It is interesting to consider whether DI application is more sensitive to prior
prison spells conditioned on whether people concurrently apply for SSI when ap-
plying for DI. The number of applications is approximately evenly split between
the two categories. The summary statistics reveal that the mean application
rate for DI-only was about 0.42% of the age 18-64 working population and was
0.39% for the concurrent category’s application rate in the same age group. (The
standard deviations, maximums, and minimums are also comparable across cate-
gories.) Accordingly, the coefficients on overall DI applications are close to the sum
of the comparable coefficients in the regressions where either DI-only applications
or combined DI with SSI applications are the dependent variables. Looking at
these coefficients reveals an effect of 0.9 DI-only applications per prisoner and 1.0
DI-SSI applications per prisoner in the linear models at a lag of six years. Thus,
prison has approximately the same effect on the group applying for means-tested
SSI relief as the group which does not apply for such relief. This is also true in
mostly all the lags. At the longest (8 and 9 year) lags for the SSI-DI group, the
Sargan test starts to break down but this may be due to reductions in the amount
of the data at the latest lags. (Nine year lags require mapping onto disability
applications beginning no earlier than 1997.)
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Graph 3: Effect on Log DI Apps by Log Pris. per Cap. sorted by lag time
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While there does not seem to be much difference in prison’s effect on the
two groups in the linear model, the result is somewhat different for the log model.
In the log model, prisoners per capita results in a positive and significant elasticity
of 0.9 on the DI-SSI group when six years out. With the DI-only group, prison has
an elasticity of 0.3 here and is not significant. Thus, it may be that people who do
not fall into the post-prison means-tested category find that prison had less of a
disabling effect. The rationale here is that the population that satisfies the means-
test may be at higher risk for disability insurance with an additional prison spell;
they may lack support services that a higher income group has to either cope with
disability or be able to survive without public assistance. These numbers must be
taken with caution however. The Sargan p-value numbers for DI-only log model
are somewhat low (0.12) whereas they are quite strong in the DI-SSI log model.
Although the Sargan value for the log DI-only case is not enough on its own to
reject the validity of the instruments, it is possible that misspecification with the
log model could be responsble for its difference with the DI-SSI case.
The response of the different classes of DI application to the various lags of
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prison for both the linear and log models is shown in graphs 2 and 3, respectively.
The peak of the prison effect on DI applications is approximately four to six years
out. For early lags, many inmates might still be incarcerated and there could also
be effects of the instruments directly on the tendency to apply for DI. For the later
lags, the effect of prison on additional applications is probably no longer as great
a factor, since any increased risk for DI because of prison probably has already
resulted in prior applications to the program at that point.
The other variables in the regression reveal some interesting results as well.
Most of the coefficients in the linear specifications are small (on the order of sug-
gesting that a 1% change in the variable is responsible for only .01% to .1 % of the
change in the category DI applications), but many are significant when looking
at the regressions with the six-year lagged prison variable. For instance, the per-
centage of the working population over age 50 matters for explaining within-state
variation in DI applications and is significant but only slightly positive (coefficient
of 0.0685) in the linear specifications. Age is insignificant with the log specifica-
tions although the magnitude increases (to a coefficient of 0.139). The percentage
of people who are overweight has a significant effect in all specifications but is,
interestingly enough, negative. This suggests, perhaps, that disabled people eat
less or working people eat more. This is a small effect (coefficient of -.016) for
the linear model but is much larger (-.958) for the log model. The Republican
governor variable suggests Republican administrations have an insignificant effect
on overall DI applications in the linear model but is significant but rather small
when considering DI-SSI applications. This indicates that something happens
during GOP governorships to dissuade the means-tested group from applying to
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SSI concurrently with DI. However, the effect is insignificant in the log model for
all classes of DI applications.
Other variables have inconclusive effects. In the linear model, mortality has
a strong positive effect on DI-only applications but a negative effect for the DI-
SSI group. This may mean poor people facing a terminal illness do not bother
to go through the DI application process as frequently as the group that is not
means-tested. The sign of the coefficient also is sensitive to whether a log model
or linear model is specified. Marriage has little effect on DI-application rates in
all categories and specifications. The percentage of white people in each state has
some positive predicitive power in the log specification for the DI-SSI application
group and the combined group (elasticities of 0.675 and 0.450 respectively) but is
insignificant in predicting concurrent DI & SSI applications. However, when the
linear model is used, the proportion of white people has more predictive power
with the DI-only group, although the magnitude of the coefficient drops substan-
tially.
The percentage of people who have a high school diploma has no effect on
overall DI applications in the uninstrumented log regression but is negative and
significant (with an elasticity of -1.4) in the instrumented one. A higher percentage
of high school graduates also matters for reducing concurrent DI-SSI applications
(with a -2.4 elasticity in the instrumented regression.) Of all the other variables
besides prisoners per capita, the high school coefficient seemed to move around
the most with the inclusion of the instruments. It was thought there may be some
correlation between the education policy variable of minimum legal drop-out age
and high school graduation rates, but this was only about -0.0011. However,
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the percent of high school graduates was positively correlated with the minimum
wage in each state; this correlation was approximately 0.32. The positive effect
of minimum wage on DI application combined with its positive correlation with
the proportion of high school graduates in the population suggests a positive bias
on the high school coefficient without instruments. It also might be that a high
school diploma is intrinsically more valuable for remaining in the work force in
areas with higher minimum wages. Similarly, it is conceivable that a high school
diploma might serve as a stronger signal to employers if one is actually obtained
when forced to stay in school through a minimum drop-out age.
The foreign-born variable predicts a small but negative (-.0297) effect on ap-
plying for DI in the linear model and this effect increases with the instruments.
This difference in the coefficient could occur as a result of foreign-born individuals
being attracted to states with higher minimum wages. The 0.31 correlation of the
foreign-born and minimum wage variables presumably results in a positive bias in
the uninstrumented version. The negative coefficient suggests foreigners are less
likely to apply for DI, all else equal. However, in the log version of the regression
this effect is not significant.
1.4.2 Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
A few additional adjustments to the model revealed how the coefficients were
sensitive. I had disability application data from 1993 to 2009 but chose to drop
the last two years as this made some of the Sargan numbers problematic. The
2008 and 2009 period contained many changes in the economy and the number of
people who became eligible for disability applications increased as labor force par-
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ticipation diminshed more than at any time in the last 50 years. I argue that, due
to the Great Recession, this period is systematically different than the 1993-2007
period and can be explored in a future study when more data about subsequent
years becomes available. For now, it is hard to say how some of the variables may
have changed in their effect on DI post-recession.
I also found that the instruments were somewhat weaker for the eight largest
states but worked very well for the remainder of the states. The low Cragg-Donald
statistic for the large states might be because the largest state, California, did not
vary its minimum school drop-out age during the entire period of the sample.
I considered other specifications where a time trend was used. This didn’t
change the results much although it usually made the coefficient on prison slightly
stronger for all classes of the DI variable. However, the standard errors also in-
creased to the point that the coefficient was insignificant in many lags. This may
be due to high collinearity in the data between minimum wage and time, which
was 0.84. Other specifications in which the prison variable was treated as a flow
rather than as stock were discarded as the instruments lost much of their strength,
perhaps due to the noise of the flows.
To check for collinearity between the explanatory variables, variance inflation
factors are given for the uncentered (non-fixed effects) regression of overall dis-
ability applications in Table 12. The general "rule of thumb" is that VIF’s lower
than five are acceptable. All of the variables in the regression fit this criteria.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper uses a novel approach to assess the effect of prison on subsequent
disability insurance applications. Thinking that some prisoners may be inherently
disabled, either mentally or physically, prior to going to prison, one can conclude
that a simple regression of prisoners on disability applications may not reveal
much. However, if life in prison generates disabilities for some inmates then one
might expect a relationship between the two. I use the policies of minimum wage
increases and minimum legal school drop-out ages as instrumental variables to
exogenously change the rate at which people are sent to prison. This shows that
there is a significant effect on DI applications a few years later. The 0.54 posi-
tive elasticity of prison on DI applications at a lag of six years in the log model
reflects an additional cost accompanying incarceration. As of 2012, according to
Social Security Administration data, approximately 34.9% of all DI applications
were successful. While the number of DI applications has increased drastically
since 1980, the success rate of these applications has changed through the years:
rising somewhat through the late 1990s and falling back to early 1980’s levels since
then. In 1982, the success rate was 33%. It hit a high of 52.0% in 1998 before
it began a steady decrease. To put numbers into perspective, a 0.54 per prisoner
application increase corresponds to a 0.18 per prisoner award increase today and
would correspond to a 0.28 per prisoner award increase in the late 1990’s, a period
covered by this paper. One can consider that the cost of incarcerating additional
prisoners now must include a figure that corresponds to paying 18% to 28% of
these prisoners their disability replacement wages. This is perhaps an unforeseen
consequence of excessive incarceration, but potentially a real one. It remains to
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be seen whether prison is getting harsher over time as Haney suggested. If he is
correct in this supposition, then one can only expect the percentage of ex-inmates
seeking DI benefits to continue to increase.
The effect of prison on DI insurance is roughly the same whether one applies
to the means-tested SSI program concurrently or not. This is true at least with the
linear specification although the log specification suggests that the means-tested
group applies for DI more often as a result of an incarceration spell. Explanations
for why this may be are tenuous at best but it could be due to a lack of resources
for the poor group to recover from the harsh, disabling conditions of prison. It
also might be that the effects of prison are harder on the acquaintances of poor
prisoners than richer ones. Poorer people related to someone incarcerated are
likely stretched even thinner and may come to rely more on public assistance and
also experience more relative hardship than richer people. The poor may also ex-
perience increased "neighborhood effects" and suffer the stigma of living in an area
disproportionately populated by prisoners; this reduces employment possibilities
and subsequently increases the hazard for DI.
In any event, there does seem to be an effect of prison on DI applications and
subsequent awards. This has policy relevance as the number of people on DI has
grown since the days when Bound and Burkhauser published their seminal article
about it in 1999. Even though the prospect of successful applications have dropped
from about 50% to 34% since that time, application numbers have increased 250%
and the diagnoses accompanying successful awards have shifted more to non-lethal
conditions, causing longer spells on the DI program. These cases include mental
disorders, many of which may be the result of a prison sentence. Given that many
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people are applying in their 30’s and 40’s (especially including ex-inmates) some
of the longer DI spells have not even been concluded in the fifteen year time frame
studied here, even if began prior to 1994. If a person is on DI until "retirement"
at age 65, a spell by a younger worker is significantly more costly than that of an
older worker, despite smaller replacement wages. As a person at 35 would be on
disability for six times as long as one at 60, the younger DI population deserves
substantial policy attention. Since the population of ex-inmates is growing fastest
in the youngest age groups (age under 40), the question of when ex-inmates apply
for DI is crucial for determining the cost of incarceration and its effect on entitle-
ment programs. If these inmates are removing themselves from the labor force as
a result of prison-induced disability, prison may also be having an unforseen role
on the dwindling labor force participation issue. The results of this paper sug-
gest that prison, employment, and entitlements may tie together in unexpected
ways. More study with different data and models, such as panel data (if available),
should be considered.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Variable Key
Variable Label Description
Prisoner Per Capita PPCL6 Prisoners Per Capita Lagged Six Years in Each State
Mortality Rate Mort. Rate Mortality Rate Per Capita
Percent HS Plus % HSPlus Percent in Each State with a HS education or more
Percent Age 50+ % Age+50 Percent of Adult Pop 18-64 Aged over 50 in Each State
Percent Overweight % Overweight Percent Identified as Overweight (by BMI) in Each State
Republican Governor Rep. Gov. Binary Variable for Republican Governor in State
Percent Married % Married Percent Married in Each State
Percent White % White Percent Identified as White in Each State
Percent Foreign-Born % For. Born Percent Identified as Foreign-Born in Each State
The Prisoners Per Capita variable is a percentage of the working age population in each state.
The other percentage variables are based on total state populations.
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Table 1.2: Response of Combined DI-Only and DI-SSI Applications to Prison Variables†
Specifications
Variable 2 yr. lag 3 yr. lag 4 yr. lag 5 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. -2.12 x 10−1** -1.41 x 10−1 -4.25x 10−2 7.31 x 10−3
(1.00 x 10−2) (9.00 x 10−2) (9.54 x 10−2) (8.98 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 3.23 x 10−1 1.10 x 10−0** 1.33 x 10−0*** 2.00 x 10−0***
(5.18 x 10−1) (4.95 x 10−1) (4.88 x 10−1) (5.56 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.2075 0.9897 0.9998 0.8141
Cragg-Donald Statistic 12.82 15.28 15.42 14.79
R-squared 0.843 0.842 0.841 0.841
R-squared (IV) 0.821 0.828 0.804 0.800
Variable 6 yr. lag 7 yr. lag 8 yr. lag 9 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. 1.41 x 10−1 2.36 x 10−1** 2.67x 10−1*** 3.55 x 10−1***
(9.44 x 10−2) (9.74 x 10−2) (9.93 x 10−2) (9.94 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 1.96 x 10−0*** 1.33 x 10−0*** 9.92 x 10−1*** 6.26 x 10−1**
(5.28 x 10−1) (4.47 x 10−1) (3.93 x 10−1) (3.88 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.9224 0.8604 0.2793 0.1794
Cragg-Donald Statistic 15.48 16.30 18.20 15.47
R-squared 0.835 0.857 0.870 0.890
R-squared (IV) 0.830 0.855 0.889 0.880
State Level Co-Variates Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult
population aged 18-64. State-level covariates include the variables for mortality rate, percent white,
percent with at least a HS diploma, percent at least 50 years old, percent foreign born, percent
married, percent overweight, and an indicator for Republican governor.
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Table 1.3: Response of DI-Only Applications to Prison†
Specifications
Variable 2 yr. lag 3 yr. lag 4 yr. lag 5 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. 3.24 x 10−2 6.93 x 10−2 1.09 x 10−1** 1.08 x 10−1**
(5.29 x 10−2) (5.01 x 10−2) (4.80 x 10−2) (4.70 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 2.40 x 10−1 5.76 x 10−1** 6.31 x 10−1*** 1.00 x 10−0***
(2.71 x 10−1) (2.50 x 10−1) (2.40 x 10−1) (2.74 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.2566 0.8573 0.4559 0.6846
Cragg-Donald Statistic 12.82 15.28 15.42 14.78
R-squared 0.787 0.789 0.789 0.789
R-squared (IV) 0.771 0.779 0.756 0.755
Variable 6 yr. lag 7 yr. lag 8 yr. lag 9 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. 1.30 x 10−1** 1.14 x 10−1** 7.78 x 10−2 9.89 x 10−2*
(5.02 x 10−2) (5.37 x 10−2) (5.47 x 10−2) (5.39 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 8.98 x 10−1*** 5.38 x 10−1** 4.24 x 10−1** 4.60 x 10−1**
(2.61 x 10−1) (2.34 x 10−1) (2.14 x 10−1) (2.18 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.4019 0.2992 0.7889 0.7242
Cragg-Donald Statistic 15.49 16.30 18.20 15.48
R-squared 0.790 0.791 0.807 0.835
R-squared (IV) 0.774 0.790 0.819 0.771
State Level Co-Variates Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of DI-only applications per adult population aged 18-64. State-level
covariates include the variables for mortality rate, percent white, percent with at least a HS
diploma, percent at least 50 years old, percent foreign born, percent married, percent overweight,
and an indicator for Republican governor.
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Table 1.4: Response of DI-SSI Applications to Prison†
Specifications
Variable 2 yr. lag 3 yr. lag 4 yr. lag 5 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. −2.40 x 10−1*** −2.05 x 10−1*** −1.44x 10−1** −9.16 x 10−2
(6.29 x 10−2) (5.97 x 10−2) (5.75 x 10−2) (5.63 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 1.18 x 10−1 5.47 x 10−1* 7.08 x 10−1** 9.97 x 10−1***
(3.25 x 10−1) (3.06 x 10−1) (3.03 x 10−1) (3.29 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.3025 0.8802 0.5517 0.4676
Cragg-Donald Statistic 12.91 15.53 15.72 14.93
R-squared 0.843 0.841 0.841 0.840
R-squared (IV) 0.821 0.827 0.812 0.802
Variable 6 yr. lag 7 yr. lag 8 yr. lag 9 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. 2.13 x 10−2 1.22 x 10−1** 1.88 x 10−1*** 2.53 x 10−1***
(5.87 x 10−2) (5.95 x 10−2) (5.90 x 10−2) (5.86 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 1.06 x 10−0*** 7.92 x 10−1*** 5.60 x 10−1** 1.56 x 10−1
(3.17 x 10−1) (2.72 x 10−1) (2.31 x 10−1) (2.28 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.3922 0.2301 0.0372 0.0526
Cragg-Donald Statistic 15.66 17.79 16.31 15.48
R-squared 0.834 0.861 0.878 0.898
R-squared (IV) 0.835 0.867 0.899 0.902
State Level Co-Variates Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of DI-SSI applications per adult population aged 18-64. State-level covariates
include the variables for mortality rate, percent white, percent with at least a HS diploma, percent
at least 50 years old, percent foreign born, percent married, percent overweight, and an indicator for
Republican governor.
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Table 1.5: Response of Log Combined DI-Only and DI-SSI Applications to Selected Variables†
Specifications
Variable 2 yr. lag 3 yr. lag 4 yr. lag 5 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. -1.22 x 10−2** -1.05 x 10−2** -7.80x 10−2* -9.04 x 10−2**
(4.92 x 10−2) (4.81 x 10−2) (4.69 x 10−2) (3.95 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) -4.07 x 10−2 3.44 x 10−1 3.66 x 10−1 5.54 x 10−1**
(3.86 x 10−1) (3.75 x 10−1) (3.00 x 10−1) (2.56 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.9447 0.6393 0.7958 0.3447
Cragg-Donald Statistic 5.29 5.96 8.97 13.46
R-squared 0.764 0.763 0.764 0.764
R-squared (IV) 0.726 0.746 0.723 0.708
Variable 6 yr. lag 7 yr. lag 8 yr. lag 9 yr. lag
Pris. Per. Cap. -4.26 x 10−2 -1.85 x 10−2 3.48x 10−2 1.01 x 10−1
(5.00 x 10−2) (5.39 x 10−2) (5.82 x 10−2) (6.21 x 10−2)
Pris. Per. Cap. (with IV) 5.43 x 10−1** 2.75 x 10−1 3.13 x 10−1 1.58 x 10−1
(2.43 x 10−1) (2.33 x 10−1) (2.32 x 10−1) (2.50 x 10−1)
Sargan p-value 0.2865 0.4750 0.7324 0.4377
Cragg-Donald Statistic 15.63 15.88 16.93 14.26
R-squared 0.767 0.770 0.791 0.812
R-squared (IV) 0.754 0.774 0.809 0.796
State Level Co-Variates Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult
population aged 18-64. State-level covariates include the variables for mortality rate, percent
white, percent with at least a HS diploma, percent at least 50 years old, percent foreign born,
percent married, percent overweight, and an indicator for Republican governor.
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Table 1.6: Response of Log DI Apps. to Log Six Year Prison Lags and Other Variables†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPCL6 -.043 .543** .044 .324 -.142 .938***
(.050) (.244) (.055) (.248) (.065) (.344)
Mor. Rate -.039 .402 .646*** .856*** -.891*** .083
(.201) (.278) (.222) (.283) (.262) (.392)
% HSPlus -.243 -1.38** -.151 -.694 -.275 -2.406***
(.317) (.570) (.348) (.579) (.410) (.812)
% Age+50 .336*** .139 .229** .135 .521*** .160
(.085) (.120) (.094) (.122) (.110) (.169)
% Overwt. -.839*** -.958*** -.566*** -.622*** -1.209*** -1.434***
(.163) (.179) (.180) (.182) (.212) (.253)
Rep Gov. -.037*** -.012 -.020 -.008 -.063*** -.016
(.014) (.018) (.01) (.016) (.019) (.026)
% Married -.397 -.175 -.448 -.341 -.404 -.019
(.356) (.386) (.390) (.393) (.461) (.543)
% White -.024 .450* .165 .391 -.181 .675**
(.157) (.253) (.172) (.258) (.203) (.353)
% For. .196*** .057 .218*** .151** .192*** -.061
(.043) (.072) (.047) (.074) (.055) (.102)
I.V. No. Yes. No. Yes. No. Yes.
Cragg-Donald stat. - 15.63 - 15.63 - 15.56
Sargan p-value - 0.2865 - 0.1296 - 0.9795
R-Squared 0.767 0.754 0.669 0.662 0.760 0.779
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Application Type Combined Combined DI-Only DI-Only DI-SSI DI-SSI
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult
population aged 18-64. Prisoner per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.7: Response of DI Apps. to Six Year Prison
Lags and Other Variables†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2)
PPCL6 1.42x10−1 1.96x10−0***
(9.44x10−2) (5.27x10−1)
Mor. Rate −3.02x10−1∗ -3.34x10−2
(1.81x10−1) (2.31x10−1)
% HSPlus 2.45x10−3 -1.10x10−2**
(2.39x10−3) (4.77x10−3)
% Age+50 1.19x10−2 ∗ ∗∗ 6.85x10−2**
(2.12x10−3) (2.94x10−3)
% Overwt. -1.56x10−2 ∗ ∗∗ -1.60x10−2***
(3.08x10−3) (3.72x10−3)
Rep Gov. -2.78x10−4 ∗ ∗∗ -1.42x10−4
(9.37x10−5) (1.20x10−4)
% Married -3.07x10−3 -7.68x10−4
(2.36x10−3) (2.92x10−3)
% White -1.54x10−3 4.80x10−3
(2.07x10−3) (3.07x10−3)
% For. -3.42x10−3 -2.97x10−2***
(5.38x10−3) (9.86x10−3)
I.V. No. Yes.
Cragg-Donald stat. - 15.49
Sargan p-value - 0.9224
R-Squared 0.847 0.797
State FE Yes. Yes.
Application Type Combined Combined
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value
<0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and
concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult population
aged 18-64. Prisoner per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.8: Response of DI Apps. to Six Year Prison Lags and Other Variables†
Specifications
Variable (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPCL6 1.29x10−1** 8.98x10−1*** 2.13x10−3 1.06x10−0***
(5.02x10−2) (2.61x10−1) (5.87x10−2) (3.17x10−1)
Mor. Rate 1.81x10−1* 2.95 x 10−1** -4.85x10−1*** -3.26x10−1**
(9.62x10−2) (1.14x10−1) (1.13x10−1) (1.40x10−1)
% HSPlus 2.27x10−3** -3.40x10−3 4.37x10−4 -7.40x10−3**
(1.27x10−3) (2.36x10−3) (1.49x10−3) (2.91x10−3)
% Age+50 5.18x10−3*** 3.03x10−3** 6.70x10−3*** 3.78x10−3***
(1.13x10−3) (1.45x10−3) (1.33x10−3) (1.78x10−3)
% Overwt. -4.95x10−3*** -5.09x10−3*** -1.05x10−2*** -1.08x10−2***
(1.64x10−3) (1.83x10−3) (1.93x10−3) (2.26x10−3)
Rep Gov. -5.21x10−5 4.42x10−6 - -2.27x10−4*** -1.44x10−4**
(4.98x10−5) (5.91x10−5) (5.85x10−5) (7.28x10−5)
% Married -1.59x10−3 -6.10x10−4 -1.37x10−3 -1.34x10−4
(1.26x10−3) (1.44x10−3) (1.47x10−3) (1.76x10−3)
% White 1.43x10−3 4.11x10−3*** -2.89x10−3** -6.38x10−4
(1.10x10−3) (1.52x10−3) (1.23x10−3) (1.84x10−3)
% For. 1.43x10−3 -9.64x10−3** 5.30x10−3 -2.00x10−2***
(2.86x10−3) (4.87x10−3) (3.35x10−3) (5.86x10−3)
I.V. No. Yes. No. Yes.
Cragg-Donald stat. - 15.49 - 15.66
Sargan p-value - 0.4019 - 0.3922
R-Squared 0.791 0.745 0.846 0.805
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
Application Type DI-Only DI-Only DI-SSI DI-SSI
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult population
aged 18-64. Prisoner per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.9: Response of Combined DI-Only & DI-SSI Apps. to Selected Variables†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 5.38 x 10−1*** 1.69 x 10−1** 1.42 x 10−1 1.42 x 10−1
(6.55 x 10−2) (8.61 x 10−2) (8.67 x 10−2) (9.44 x 10−2)
Mor. Rate - -2.69 x 10−1* -2.73 x 10−1* -3.02 x 10−1*
(1.58 x 10−1) (1.57 x 10−1) (1.81 x 10−1)
% HSPlus - 3.29 x 10−3 2.31 x 10−3 2.45 x 10−3
(2.37 x 10−3) (2.38 x 10−3) (2.39 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 1.25 x 10−2*** 1.21 x 10−2*** 1.19 x 10−2***
(2.03 x 10−3) (2.04 x 10−3) (2.12 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -1.49 x 10−2*** -1.55 x 10−2*** -1.56 x 10−2***
(3.06 x 10−3) (3.05 x 10−3) (3.08 x 10−3)
Rep Gov. - - -2.77 x 10−4*** -2.78 x 10−4***
(9.28 x 10−5) (9.37 x 10−5)
% Married - - -3.44 x 10−3 -3.07 x 10−3
(2.25 x 10−3) (2.36 x 10−3)
% White - - - -1.54 x 10−3
(2.07 x 10−3)
% For. - - - -3.42 x 10−3
(5.38 x 10−3)
I.V. No. No. No. No.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.812 0.842 0.847 0.847
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications
per adult population aged 18-64. Prisoner per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.10: Response of Combined DI-Only and DI-SSI Applications With Instruments†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 9.86 x 10−1*** 1.14 x 10−0*** 1.17 x 10−0*** 1.96 x 10−0***
(9.37 x 10−2) (2.60 x 10−1) (2.82 x 10−1) (5.27 x 10−1)
Mor. Rate - 3.10 x 10−1 3.28 x 10−1 -3.34 x 10−2
(2.21 x 10−1) (2.27 x 10−1) (2.31 x 10−1)
% HSPlus - -5.67 x 10−3* -6.18 x 10−3* -1.10 x 10−2**
(3.35 x 10−3) (3.35 x 10−3) (4.77 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 6.03 x 10−2** 5.82 x 10−3** 6.85 x 10−2**
(2.70 x 10−3) (2.70 x 10−3) (2.94 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -1.75 x 10−2*** -1.76 x 10−2*** -1.60 x 10−2***
(3.29 x 10−3) (3.29 x 10−3) (3.72 x 10−3)
Rep. Gov. - - -2.45 x 10−4** -1.42 x 10−4
(9.89 x 10−5) (1.20 x 10−4)
% Married - - -9.37 x 10−4 -7.68 x 10−4
(2.63 x 10−3) (2.92 x 10−3)
% White - - - 4.80 x 10−3
(3.07 x 10−3)
% For. - - - -2.97 x 10−2∗∗∗
(9.86 x 10−3)
I.V. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.795 0.825 0.827 0.797
Cragg-Donald stat. 307.00 44.06 37.71 15.49
Sargan p-value 0.1622 0.2026 0.3755 0.9224
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is combined rate of DI-only and concurrent SSI-DI applications per adult
population aged 18-64. Prisoner per capita is instrumented using state minimum wage and
minimum legal high school drop-out age.
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Table 1.11: Response of DI-Only Applications to Selected Variables†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 2.43 x 10−1*** 1.26 x 10−1*** 1.17 x 10−1** 1.29 x 10−1**
(3.40 x 10−2) (4.55 x 10−2) (4.61 x 10−2) (5.02 x 10−2)
Mor. Rate - 1.87 x 10−1** 1.86 x 10−1** 1.81 x 10−1*
(8.35 x 10−2) (8.35 x 10−2) (9.62 x 10−2)
% HSPlus - 2.68 x 10−3** 2.40 x 10−3* 2.27 x 10−3**
(1.25 x 10−3) (1.26 x 10−3) (1.27 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 5.07 x 10−3*** 4.91 x 10−3*** 5.18 x 10−3***
(1.08 x 10−3) (1.08 x 10−3) (1.13 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -4.93 x 10−3*** -5.12 x 10−3*** -4.95 x 10−3***
(1.62 x 10−3) (1.63 x 10−3) (1.64 x 10−3)
Rep. Gov. - - -5.73 x 10−5 -5.21 x 10−5
(4.94 x 10−5) (4.98 x 10−5)
% Married - - -1.13 x 10−3 -1.59 x 10−3
(1.20 x 10−3) (1.26 x 10−3)
% White - - - 1.43 x 10−3
(1.10 x 10−3)
% For. - - - 1.43 x 10−3
(2.86 x 10−3)
I.V. No. No. No. No.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.766 0.789 0.790 0.791
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of DI-only application per adult population aged 18-64.
Adults who applied to SSI concurrently are not in the dependent variable here. Prisoner
per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.12: Response of DI-Only Applications With Instruments†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 3.99 x 10−1*** 4.48 x 10−1*** 4.60 x 10−1*** 8.98 x 10−1***
(4.77 x 10−2) (1.30 x 10−1) (1.42 x 10−1) (2.61 x 10−1)
Mor. Rate - 3.80 x 10−1*** 3.86 x 10−1*** 2.95 x 10−1**
(1.10 x 10−1) (1.14 x 10−1) (1.14 x 10−1)
% HSPlus - -2.91 x 10−3 -4.12 x 10−4 -3.40 x 10−3
(1.68 x 10−3) (1.68 x 10−3) (2.36 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 2.90 x 10−3*** 2.84 x 10−3** 3.03 x 10−3**
(1.35 x 10−3) (1.35 x 10−3) (1.45 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -5.78 x 10−3*** -5.79 x 10−3*** -5.09 x 10−3***
(1.65 x 10−3) (1.65 x 10−3) (1.83 x 10−3)
Rep. Gov. - - -4.80 x 10−5 4.42 x 10−6
(4.96 x 10−5) (5.91 x 10−5)
% Married - - 3.29 x 10−4 -6.10 x 10−4
(1.32 x 10−3) (1.44 x 10−3)
% White - - - 4.11 x 10−3***
(1.52 x 10−3)
% For. - - - -9.64 x 10−3**
(4.87 x 10−3)
I.V. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.757 0.781 0.782 0.745
Cragg-Donald stat. 307.00 44.06 37.71 15.49
Sargan p-value 0.0595 0.0339 0.0478 0.4019
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of DI-only application per adult population aged 18-64. Adults
who applied to SSI concurrently are not in the dependent variable here. Prisoner per capita is
instrumented using state minimum wage and minimum legal high school drop-out age.
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Table 1.13: Response of Concurrent SSI-DI Applications to Selected Variables†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 2.99 x 10−1*** 4.63 x 10−2 2.80 x 10−2 2.13 x 10−3
(4.14 x 10−2) (5.42 x 10−2) (5.44 x 10−2) (5.87 x 10−2)
Mor. Rate - -4.47 x 10−1*** -4.51 x 10−1*** -4.85 x 10−1***
(9.93 x 10−2) (9.82 x 10−2) (1.13 x 10−1)
% HSPlus - 8.53 x 10−4 1.66 x 10−4 4.37 x 10−4
(1.49 x 10−3) (1.41 x 10−3) (1.49 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 7.35 x 10−3*** 7.01 x 10−3*** 6.70 x 10−3***
(1.28 x 10−3) (1.28 x 10−3) (1.33 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -9.82 x 10−3*** -1.03 x 10−2*** -1.05 x 10−2***
(1.93 x 10−3) (1.92 x 10−3) (1.93 x 10−3)
Rep Gov. - - -2.21 x 10−4*** -2.27 x 10−4***
(5.81 x 10−5) (5.85 x 10−5)
% Married - - -2.14 x 10−3 -1.37 x 10−3
(1.40 x 10−3) (1.47 x 10−3)
% White - - - −2.89 x 10−3**
(1.23 x 10−3)
% For. - - - 5.30 x 10−3
(3.35 x 10−3)
I.V. No. No. No. No.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.806 0.840 0.845 0.846
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of concurrent SSI and DI application per adult population
aged 18-64. Adults who applied only to DI are not in the dependent variable here.
Prisoner per capita is not instrumented.
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Table 1.14: Response of Concurrent SSI-DI Applications With Instruments†
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
PPCL6 5.88 x 10−1*** 6.86 x 10−1*** 7.10 x 10−1*** 1.06 x 10−0***
(5.93 x 10−2) (1.66 x 10−1) (1.79 x 10−1) (3.17 x 10−1)
Mor. Rate - -6.84 x 10−2 -5.61 x 10−2 -3.26 x 10−1**
(1.40 x 10−3) (1.44 x 10−1) (1.40 x 10−1)
% HSPlus - -5.05 x 10−3** -5.47 x 10−3** -7.40 x 10−3**
(2.13 x 10−3) (2.13 x 10−3) (2.91 x 10−3)
% Age+50 - 3.06 x 10−3* 2.91 x 10−3* 3.78 x 10−3***
(1.71 x 10−3) (1.71 x 10−3) (1.78 x 10−3)
% Overwt. - -1.16 x 10−2*** -1.17 x 10−2*** -1.08 x 10−2***
(2.09 x 10−3) (2.08 x 10−3) (2.26 x 10−3)
Rep. Gov. - - -1.98 x 10−4*** -1.44 x 10−4**
(6.25 x 10−5) (7.28 x 10−5)
% Married - - 7.10 x 10−3 -1.34 x 10−4
(1.66 x 10−3) (1.76 x 10−3)
% White - - - -6.38 x 10−4
(1.84 x 10−3)
% For. - - - -2.00 x 10−2***
(5.86 x 10−3)
I.V. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
State FE Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
R-Squared 0.786 0.816 0.820 0.805
Cragg-Donald stat. 306.61 43.81 37.50 15.66
Sargan p-value 0.5030 0.7344 0.8609 0.3922
*** = p-value <0.01; ** = p-value < 0.05; * = p-value <0.1
† Dependent variable is rate of concurrent SSI and DI application per adult population aged
18-64. Adults who applied only to DI are not in the dependent variable here. Prisoner per
capita is instrumented using state minimum wage and minimum legal high school drop-out
age.
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Table 1.15: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
DI-Only Apps. Per Adult Pop. 0.00428 0.00106 0.00037 0.01017
SSI-DI Apps Per Adult Pop. 0.00395 0.00148 0.00027 0.00920
Combined Apps Per Adult Pop. 0.00828 0.00235 0.00065 0.01648
Prisoner Per Cap 0.00329 0.00136 0.00069 0.00873
Mortality Rate 0.00855 0.00130 0.00380 0.01190
Percent HSPlus 0.851 0.046 0.690 0.944
Percent Age+50 0.279 0.037 0.138 0.377
Percent Overweight 0.349 0.015 0.271 0.425
Republican Governor 0.549 0.497 0 1
Percent Married 0.551 0.031 0.471 0.649
Percent White 0.766 0.152 0.156 0.989
Percent Foreign Born 0.0670 0.0578 0.0080 0.300
Relevant Instruments
Minimum Wage 5.20 1.42 1.60 9.04
Minimum Dropout Age 16.67 0.86 16 18
Dependent Variables
DI-Only Apps Per Adult Pop. 0.00428 0.00106 0.000373 0.01017
Concurrent DI-SSI Apps Per Adult Pop. 0.00395 0.00148 0.00027 0.00920
n =1250. Observations at state level 1988-2012
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Table 1.16: Collinearity Matrix of Selected Variables
PPC Mort. %HSPlus %Age+50 % Ovwt. RepGov. Married %White %For.
PPC 1.00
Mort Rate. -0.06 1.00
% HSPlus -0.20 -0.42 1.00
% Age+50 -0.02 0.50 0.13 1.00
% Ovwt. -0.03 0.06 0.14 0.10 1.00
Rep. Gov. 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.04 1.00
% Marr. -0.27 0.01 0.02 -0.30 0.02 0.00 1.00
% White -0.47 0.33 0.28 0.07 0.17 -0.04 0.47 1.00
% Foreign 0.18 -0.40 0.06 0.02 -0.13 0.06 -0.48 -0.61 1.00
Collinearity Matrix
Table 1.17: Collinearity Matrix of Prisoners Per Capita with DI
Applications Variables (per Adult Pop. 18-64)
PPC Combined DI-SSI DI Only DI-SSI
PPC 1.00
Combined DI-SSI 0.13 1.00
DI Only 0.07 0.88 1.00
DI-SSI 0.14 0.94 0.66 1.00
Collinearity Matrix
Table 1.18: Collinearity Matrix of Selected Variables with Instruments (per Adult
Pop. 18-64)
% HS Plus % Foreign Min. Wage Min. Dropout Age
% HS Plus 1.00
% Foreign 0.0487 1.00
Min. Wage 0.2558 0.3167 1.00
Min. Dropout Age -0.0011 0.1536 0.0284 1.00
Collinearity Matrix
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Table 1.19: Collinearity Matrix of Prison Per Capita with Instruments (per Adult
Pop. 18-64)
% Prison Per. Capita Min. Wage Min. Dropout Age
% Prison Per. Capita 1.00
Min. Wage 0.2265 1.00
Min. Dropout Age -0.0257 0.1010 1.00
Collinearity Matrix
Table 1.20: Uncentered VIF’s of Indepen-
dent Variables in Regression of Combined DI-
only and DI-SSI applications (per Adult Pop.
18-64)
Variable VIF
Mortality Rate 3.24
% White 2.96
% HSPlus 2.27
% Age+50 2.10
% Foreign Born 2.03
% Married 1.67
Prisoner Per Capita lagged 3 years 1.41
% Overweight 1.06
Republican Governor 1.03
Mean VIF 1.97
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Chapter 2
Manufacturer Bundling and Price
Discrimination With
Heterogeneous Retail Markets
2.1 Introduction
Manufacturers often discriminate among consumers by offering different quan-
tities of a good at nonlinear prices. Large fries versus small fries, a season ticket
versus a single game ticket, and 900 cell phone minutes per month versus 450
minutes per month are all examples of setting different quantities and prices in a
package so that excess surplus can be extracted from buyers to maximize profit.
The idea that a manufacturer can package his products into different quantities to
increase his profit through price discrimination is long established. Also, manu-
facturers may combine different types of goods in a package to price discriminate.
Such examples may include offering a hotel room with an airline seat; a movie
ticket with a voucher for a burger; or a free photography lesson with the purchase
of a camera. The idea that a multi-product manufacturer can include different
types of goods in a package to facilitate discrimination is also nothing new.
The literature has given much attention to what can happen when a monop-
olist manufacturing one good seeks to optimize profit non-linearly while selling
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different quantities of the good to heterogeneous buyers. The literature also con-
siders in detail the ramifications of nonlinear pricing by a multi-product monop-
olist who offers bundles of different type products to heterogeneous buyers, but
often only when the bundles are constrained to those in which the number of each
type of a good in a bundle has a maximum of one. There has been scant research
done, however, on a manufacturer’s non-linear pricing strategy when he may of-
fer different quantities of different types of goods in a package to heterogeneous
buyers. Nevertheless, such deals are often common when a manufacturer deals
with retailers, who not only may buy many of each good but many of different
types of goods together. For example, a supermarket could buy a package with
a given quantity of ketchup bottles and a given quantity of mustard bottles from
the same producer; or a sporting goods store could buy a package of many hockey
sticks and many basketballs from an athletics supplier; or an auto-dealer could
buy various numbers of certain types of cars from an upstream manufacturer.
Accordingly, there has also been a lack of analysis about how downstream par-
ties in these cases may be affected when the upstream manufacturer is allowed to
sell different types of goods in the same multiple-quantities package. This paper
seeks to analyze the extent to which downstream parties, such as retailers and
consumers are harmed, or even helped, by permitting a manufacturer to bundle
different types of goods. While the fact that the upstream parties’ profit is weakly
improved by bundling is not a stunning result, this paper takes the focus off the
manufacturer and looks at the impact downstream on welfare when the parties
buying from the manufacturer have heterogeneity. The added value here is assess-
ing which retailers and consumers are harmed or helped by bundling and how that
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harm or help relates to the heterogeneity of demand for the manufacturer’s goods.
The model explores how demand heterogeneity may lead to asymmetry to benefits
and harms accrued downstream with bundling. While it is nowhere near a com-
plete analysis, this paper will lay out some conditions under which retailers earn
a profit or not and specify conditions under which some retailers may be harmed
more than others. It will also analyze some relationships between the ability of
the retailers to earn profit after bundling and the ability of consumers to benefit
from bundling. Also, a specific example will specify conditions under which some
retailer revenues improve with bundling thereby aligning these retailers’ interest
with that of the manufacturer but against other retailers. All of these issues could
have implications for the regulation of multi-product firms or mergers in which
merged firms may opt to bundle their products and resell downstream to retailers.
This paper can also contrast the effect that bundling has on welfare when an
intermediate, such as a retailer, is added to the good supply chain with the case
of a manufacturer selling directly to customers. Typically, the literature has ex-
amples in these latter cases in which total surplus improves as a result of bundling
but customers suffer the effect of price discrimination and see welfare diminish. It
is shown here that the retailer can act as a buffer between the consumer and the
welfare-diminishing effects of price discrimination of bundling. Bundling weakly
allows total production to go up; and since retailers seek to sell the extra goods by
pricing at or below the value of the marginal consumer, some gains are passed onto
the consumer even if taken from the retailer. The manufacturer and consumers’
interests become aligned while that of the retailer may often suffer. Such issues
could be quite important either in pre-merger investigations of mergers between
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firms that subsequently are likely to engage in bundling; or in rule of reason appli-
cations balancing potential welfare improvements, especially to final consumers,
and the anticompetitive effects of a firm’s unilateral transition to bundling.
2.2 Literature Review
The idea that a multi-product manufacturer can bundle his products to increase
his profit is long established in a variety of ways. Bundling is taken here as the
ability to sell multiple types of goods in potentially different quantities in a single
package. Adams and Yellen (1976) analyze bundles with one of each type of good
in a bundle and show that bundling can lead to welfare-enhancing or welfare-
diminishing distortions provided other distortions (such as monopoly producers)
are present. Schmalensee (1982) and Lewbel (1985) show specifically that mixed
bundling, when the number of each type of a good in a bundle has a maximum
of one, can effectively act as a mechanism for price discrimination amongst mul-
tiple buyers; this holds in the cases with independent goods and complements
or substitutes, respectively. Shaffer and O’Brien (2005) take a somewhat differ-
ent approach. They show that in the market for intermediate goods, where a
manufacturer may sell to only a single retailer, bundling still allows manufacturer
profit to improve when contracts are non-linear and various prices can be charged
for various quantities in a package. In this case, the manufacturer gains ability
to extract surplus through bundling by removing the retailer’s “threat" to buy a
package of just one type of good or the other. The goods in Shaffer’s paper are
modeled as substitutes. Without bundling, the manufacturer has an incentive to
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lower the quantity of each good sold to the retailer below vertically-integrated lev-
els in order to minimize a retailer’s incremental profit from purchase of each good.
It is then willing to pay the two fixed fees for packages of the two separate goods
that maximize profit for the manufacturer. With bundling allowed, quantities may
be increased to vertically-integrated levels and fixed fees can be raised since the
retailer’s threat is now reduced to completely passing on a manufacturer’s offer.
Whinston (1990) analyzes bundling and tying contracts as a means to foreclose
competition. He shows that a manufacturer’s profits may increase through exclu-
sion of rivals who produce the same goods competitively.
The focus here will not be the use of bundling to exclude rivals and maximize
profit in the strand of Whinston. The approach taken in this paper will eventually
perhaps be best described as a mix between the worlds of Shaffer and O’Brien and
that of Schmalensee or Lewbel; this paper explores what happens when manufac-
turers can sell to multiple retailers and can use bundling to price discriminate
between them. Unlike Schmalensee & Lewbel, however, it is not assumed that
bundles are constrained to those in which the number of each type of a good in a
bundle has a maximum of one. Manufacturers are able to sell packages containing
any quantity of any type good they produce; if bundling is allowed the differ-
ent type goods may be sold together. Thus, this paper allows for more general
contracts of quantities and prices between retailer and manufacturer then they
consider. Also, unlike Shaffer and O’Brien this paper does not consider the goods
produced by a manufacturer to be substitutes. In addition, Shaffer and O’Brien
allows for there to be some competition between the manufacturers producing the
upstream substitute goods but allow the middleman retailer to be a monopolist.
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This paper’s focus will instead be the impact on bundling among different sets of
retailers with heterogenous demands for the various goods to assess the effect of
bundling combined with the heterogeneity; also assessed will be the interplay of
the relative demand strength with benefits that may accrue to all three parties:
monopolist manufacturer, territorial retailers with market power, and consumers.
The results sought here will add insight to the extent to which downstream
parties, such as retailers and consumers are harmed, or even helped, by permitting
a manufacturer to bundle his goods. This paper takes the focus off the manufac-
turer and looks at the impact downstream on welfare when the parties buying
from the manufacturer have heterogeneity. Focusing on the manufacturer is not
the interesting case as permitting bundling simply allows manufacturers to weakly
increase profit, which is standard in the literature. The added value here is assess-
ing which retailers and consumers are harmed or helped by bundling and how that
harm or help relates to the heterogeneity of demand for the manufacturer’s goods.
Demand heterogeneity may lead to asymmetry to benefits and harms accrued
dowstream with bundling; this is especially so when requiring that manufacturers
must offer the same terms to all retailers as this paper does.
So, while papers have been written about bundling’s ability to enhance a
manufacturers’s means to price discriminate there is scant literature on how down-
stream parties are affected by this practice. Schmalenesee and Lewbel seem to
look at only certain examples for single buyers of limited bundles. As there is
also scant literature on bundling in the intermediate goods market and bundling
when non-linear contracts are allowed (with Shaffer (2005) being the only notable
exception), there has been next to none formal analysis of how downstream parties
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are affected by bundling in these contexts. Shaffer and Kolay (2003) consider a
manufacturer’s ability to price discriminate among different consumers with non-
linear arrangements but this paper only looks at packages of one type of good
and has manufacturers directly deal with consumers. Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
only look at linear pricing by upstream parties who sell directly to downstream
parties and are not concerned with retailers who resell to consumers. Dobson and
Waterson (1997) look only at linear pricing from manufacturer to retailer and do
not consider bundling or multiple goods. They also allow the retailers to com-
pete for the same consumers where as this paper allows retailers to have market
power in a territory. Milliou and Petrakis (2007) discuss upstream mergers and
multiple products but each upstream product can only be sold specifically to one
downstream firm. There, a manufactured product is exclusive to a downstream
firm unlike in this paper where the same downstream firms can buy the same
goods. The main result in Milliou and Petrakis is upstream firms prefer to remain
unmerged and act independently if bargaining is constrained to two-part tariffs
rather than wholesale prices. The mergers are shown to be welfare-decreasing un-
der these assumptions. Rennhoff and Serfes (2009) only consider bundles in which
there is a maximum of one good of each type in each bundle. In industries such
as cable T.V., they also look at downstream bundling directly to consumers, who
buy the final good, and do not consider upstream bundling by content providers or
manufacturers. They find that requirements that cable T.V. packages be “unbun-
dled” actually enhance welfare. In contrast, this paper will look at circumstances
where there can be multiple numbers of the goods in each bundle and bundling
can be welfare-enhancing. Armstrong (1996) also discusses a monopolist who can
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produce bundles of different type goods and can price non-linearly but still con-
strains the bundles to ones in which the number of each type of good in a bundle
has a maximum of one. Armstrong finds that the monopolist may exclude some
buyers through certain pricing strategies to increase profit. However, there is no
intermediate “retailer” in this paper and, accordingly, Armstrong also doesn’t con-
sider the interplay of consumer welfare with retailer profit and doesn’t consider
the various characterizations of retailer profit with and without bundling.
The goal in this paper is to create a realistic model which describes how a
multi-product manufacturer may sell their goods to downstream parties, such as
retailers, who may buy multiple quantities of multiple types of goods and then
resell the goods to consumers. However, there is no paper in the literature which
examines what happens if 1) there is an incremental change of allowing a manu-
facturer to include multiple types of goods in a package (or, that is, to go from
prohibiting bundling to allowing it); 2) the manufacturer is free to include more
than one of each type of good in a package; 3) the manufacturer may sell to het-
erogeneous buyers; 4) these buyers are retailers and they will take the items in
their package and sell them individually to final consumers; 5) the manufacturer
is able to price the packages non-linearly; 6) the manufacturer is a monopolist and
the retailers have monopolistic power in a territory. While some papers look at a
subset of these six conditions, I have found no paper that looks at all six. Given
that these conditions seem realisitic and that there are clearly multi-product man-
ufacturers with some market power reselling to retailers with at least some market
power in a territory, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to the analysis of
bundling’s effect on a market that consists of manufacturers, retailers and con-
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sumers. The focus is the interplay of some of the characteristics of each with the
effects of bundling that may accrue to each.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Modeling Assumptions
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the bundling of goods
by an upstream, monopolist manufacturer who sells items to downstream retailers
with differences in the demand functions they face when selling the items to final
consumers. The retailers can then resell the goods to consumers. The model
is kept parsimonious to best isolate these effects. To model legal realities, the
manufacturer, M must offer the same terms to all retailers. There are two goods
in the model, a and b. M may offer “packages” containing (qa, qb), which are
quantities of the a and b goods respectively. These packages may be sold at
transfer prices, T (qa, qb), to any retailer. In this setting, the manufacturer can not
only adjust the types of goods included in a package but also the volume of each
type. This gives the manufacturer additional flexibility to price discriminate, even
though the same terms must be offered to all retailers. These packages can be sold
at any price and the pricing format can be non-linear. In a world where bundling
is illegal, packages may contain positive quantities of only one of the two goods.
Multiple items of the same good can be included in the packages. For example, in
the non-bundling world, packages such as (0,152), (45,0), and (1,0) are allowed.
Packages such as (22, 33) or (1,1) are not allowed if bundling is illegal.
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The demand functions faced by a retailer i are as follows:
pai(qai) = αai − qai (2.1)
pbi(qbi) = αbi − qbi (2.2)
where pai and pbi are the prices that a retailer i can sell a good for when they are
sold in quantities qai or qbi, respectively. In general, the values αai and αbi can
take on any non-negative value but will usually not be the same. For many of
the ensuing examples, notation such as αh and αl will be used instead where ‘h’
indicates a relatively high value to a lower value denoted by l.
In this paper, these demand functions are kept simple since one of the main
focuses of the paper is to see how the relative strength of the demand functions
for the different goods facing the different retailers affects the terms which M will
offer. Heterogeneity in retailer profits and revenues can be modeled by simply ad-
justing the α terms. Allowing different slopes for the demand functions adds little
to the model if the profits and revenues of the retailers relative to one another is
the main concern. Accordingly, the above demand functions are chosen as they
enable one to model sufficient heterogeneity in the demand functions for this pur-
pose. To keep the focus on overall revenue and profits, the cost of manufacturing
the goods is kept at zero. There are no shelf space or capacity issues for the retailer
or manufacturer. The goods are kept independent. Whether substitutability or
complementarity between the goods could affect the eventual terms offered by M
is an open question, but one which might be difficult to find tractable answers to
under this set-up.
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To be clear, there are two types of prices here: the transfer prices T (qa, qb)
for the packages which are sold from the manufacturer to the retailer and the final
prices pai and pbi at which retailer i resells the goods to the final consumers. The
manufacturer may sell the goods together in multiple quantities but the retailer is
permitted to sell each good in individual units. Cournot pricing is assumed. The
retailer is a territorial monopolist with market power in its own territory.
The order of events is assumed as follows: The manufacturer chooses the
quantities of a and b in the packages and the prices of packages. He may effec-
tively make certain packages unavailable by charging a price ∞ and can limit the
retailers to only buying certain packages at certain prices. The monopolist man-
ufacturer has most of the bargaining power here. Retailers, however, are free to
buy any package which is available or buy nothing and accept a zero profit.
As a matter of semantics, it is worth emphasizing again that “packages” may
include various numbers of one or both types of goods but may only have one
type of good if bundling is per se illegal. “Bundled packages” or “bundles” are
packages made available byM which include both types of goods. The “vertically-
integrated” package is the revenue-maximizing amount. It is what the monopolists
would sell if it were managing the territories rather than retailers. As the paper
proceeds, it is good to keep in mind that the “vertically-integrated” quantities may
actually be welfare-enhancing compared to the cases where less or even nothing
is produced. One will see that the manufacturer often has an incentive to sell
less than these vertically-integrated quantities to retailers in cases where bundling
both is and is not allowed.
Manufacturer and retailers alike seek to maximize profit. For the manufac-
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turer, M , this occurs by obtaining the most value for packages sold. For retailers,
this occurs by maximizing the difference between product revenue and transfer
prices paid to M . Retailers are allowed to dump any unsold quantity of any good
at no cost. Consumer welfare is measured in the typical way which is by consid-
ering the net excess of consumer valuation over price.
2.3.2 The Single Good Case
Before proceeding further it is useful to consider what happens in this set
up when only one good is produced. The results in this section are not new
and have been found in previous papers like O’Brien and Shaffer (2005) but will
serve to help frame the results in future sections. It is included as instructive
for the reader who may not be familiar with some specific results in the price
discrimination literature.
Assume there are two retailers, R1 and R2. They face the following respective
demand functions for the good a:
pa1(qa1) = αh − qa1 (2.3)
pa2(qa2) = αl − qa2 (2.4)
where αh ≥ αl.
When deciding what packages to offer at what prices,M has a choice. Keeping
in mind it must offer the same terms to both retailers, it can offer either one
package or two. If it offers only one package, then both retailers are free to buy
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the package although it is possible not all will do so. If the manufacturer only
sells to one of the retailers, it would make the most sense if it were R1 since its
potential revenue is higher. M could maximize the revenue extracted from R1 by
making available a package of αh2 of good a at a price of
α2h
4 , which is the revenue
R1 could obtain by selling this quantity.1 This is the vertically-integrated quantity
and maximizes consumer surplus for the a good as well. R1 would agree to buy
this package as it assures a non-negative profit. R2 would not agree to do so as it
could not sell enough items of a in its market to recoup the initial transfer price
of α
2
h
4 .
However, M could do better by selling to both retailers. R2 is willing to buy
qa2 at a price of qa2αl − q2a2, the revenue it can make by selling this quantity. If
R1 buys this package it can earn a profit of (αh − αl)(qa2). R1 can profit off any
package sold to R2 as long as αh ≥ αl, which is assumed.2
The monopolist could either try to sell the same identical package of qa to
both or construct two different packages appealing to the different retailers in
order to improve its profit. If it sells the same package to both, M will not allow
R2 to earn any profit as M can always otherwise do better by charging R2, the
retailer with “weaker demand", whatever revenue it can earn from selling a fixed
quantity of the a good. Accordingly, in this case where only one package is offered,
M will sell R2 it’s vertically-integrated quantity at a price equal to the revenue
generated by that quantity. R1 can then buy the same package at the same price
1In choosing the quantity here,M is maximizing R1’s revenue function which is (αh−qa1)(qa1)
2R1’s profit is its revenue from selling R2’s package minus the transfer cost of purchasing this
package. This is (αh − qa2)(qa2)− (αl − qa2)(qa2) = (αh − αl)(qa2)
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and earn a small profit. M accordingly seeks to choose qa2 to maximize:
2(αl − qa2)(qa2) (2.5)
which is 2 times the revenue R2 can earn by selling good a. M will set this quan-
tity to equal αl2 and can sell this to R2 at
α2l
4 . Since R1 finds it profitable to buy
this package it also does so andM earns α
2
l
2 in profit. Note that
α2l
2 ≤
α2h
4 whenever
αl ≤
√
2αh
2 .
We can assume that when this condition holds that if M only sells one package
then it will only sell to R1 as described previously rather than sell a single package
to both R1 and R2.
However, this is a potentially unimportant point as M has the option to sell
separate packages to the different retailers, can entice each to do so and can earn
more profit by doing so. However, before one sees this, one needs to keep in mind
that R1 can always earn a profit of (αh − αl)(qa2) off any quantity qa2 sold to R2
and always has the option of buying R2’s package to acheive this. If M is to sell
any package to R1, then its best option is to set a quantity which creates R1’s
maximum revenue in its own territory but still assures R1 the profit it can earn
by buying and reselling R2’s package. This means M does best by offering R1 a
quantity of a = αh2 at a price equal to
α2h
4 − (αh − αl)(qa2). However, M can still
earn more profit by selling R2 a package of qa2 at a price of (αl − qa2)qa2 as well.
Importantly, M may reduce qa2 if it sufficiently reduces the profit it must assure
R1 in buying any package. Specifically, to balance these competing concerns, M
is going to choose qa2 to maximize it’s profit, pim:
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pim = (αl − qa2)qa2 + α
2
h
4 − (αh − αl)(qa2) (2.6)
where the first term is the revenue generated from R2’s package, the second term
is the revenue from R1’s vertically-integrated quantity and the third-term is R1’s
profit from buying R2’s vertically-integrated package, which must be assured to
R1 in any deal. It is a given that qa1 will be R1’s vertically-integrated quantity of
αh
2 but solving the first order condition for qa2 yields:
qa2 =
2αl − αh
2 (2.7)
where it is seen that M actually finds it profitable to reduce R2’s quantity from
its vertically-integrated level. In fact, the only time R2 will receive its vertically-
integrated quantity here is if αl ≥ αh, which violates a previous condition. For
R2 to earn any positive quantity at all, it must be that αl ≥ αh2 . Otherwise, M
finds it better to sell only R1’s vertically-integrated quantity to R1 and extract all
revenue here. If αl is between αh2 and αh then putting qa2 =
2αl−αh
2 into the profit
equation reveals that M earns a profit of α
2
h+2α
2
l−2αhαl
2 by selling to both retailers.
For any value of αh2 ≤ αl ≤ αh, this profit is always higher than
α2h
4 , the maximum
M can get by selling a just to R1, or α
2
l
2 , the maximum he can get by selling the
same package of a to both retailers. Thus, provided αl ≥ αh2 , M will always opt
to sell two packages of a single good, each aimed at separate retailers.
As an aside, note that M can not simply offer a vertically-integrated package
of the single good to R2 at a price equal to the revenue generated by that package
and do better off than by only selling R1 it’s vertically-integrated package. To see
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this, note that if M offered R2 a package of αl2 of the a good at a price of
α2l
4 its
maximum profit would be:
pim =
α2l
4 +
α2h
4 − (αh − αl)
αl
2 (2.8)
where the first two terms are the vertically-integrated revenues by each retailer
and the last is the profit which M must assure R1 in order to prevent it from
buying R2’s vertically integrated package in any deal. In total, this is equal to
α2h−2αhαl+2α2l
4 . This is always less than
α2h
4 , the profit simply gained by offering R1
its own vertically-integrated quantity of a. This shows that in order for selling the
single good to both retailers to be profitable, M must reduce the quantity sold to
R2 below vertically-integrated levels.
2.3.3 Introducing multiple goods and bundling
Now let us consider what happens when another good is introduced and the
prospect of bundling is allowed. It’s easy to show consumer welfare can improve
with bundling. As a simple example consider that there are symmetric but op-
posite demand functions for two goods, a and b Here, R1 has a relatively higher
valuation of good b and R2 has the relatively high valuation of good a:
pa1(qa1) = αl − qa1 (2.9)
pb1(qb1) = αh − qb1 (2.10)
pa2(qa2) = αh − qa2 (2.11)76
pb2(qb2) = αl − qb2 (2.12)
where qji is the quantity of the j good in retailer i’s market and is sold at price
pji and where αh ≥ αl. Prior to bundling, the markets behave as in the previous
section. The retailer with the lower valuation of the good never earns a profit
and purchases a quantity of that good equivalent to 2αl−αh2 provided that αl >
αh
2 .
This is less than that retailer’s vertically-integrated quantity. The retailer with a
higher valuation of the good can earn a profit but will still purchase a package of
the good which consists of its vertically-integrated quantity, provided that he is
still assured the profit which can be earned by purchasing his counterpart retailer’s
package and reselling it. If αl ≤ αh2 , nothing is sold to the retailer with the low
valuation; the retailer with the high valuation earns no profit as he has no option
to buy another package and will accept a package of his own vertically-integrated
quantity at minimal profit to him.
Once bundling is introduced,M can sell each retailer their vertically-integrated
quantities for both goods. M can offer packages of (qa1 = αl2 , qa2 =
αh
2 ) and
(qb1 = αh2 , qb2 =
αl
2 ) to R1 and R2 respectively at a price equal to the revenue gen-
erated by their vertically-integrated quantities. This price is α
2
l
4 +
α2h
4 . If these are
the only packages made available, neither retailer will ever buy the other’s package
and earn a positive profit. If R1 buys R2’s package, for instance, he will sell no
more than αl2 of the a good and earn a revenue of
α2l
4 since selling more beyond this
diminishes profit (as, beyond the vertically-integrated level, elasticity goes above
one) and will choose to dump any excess quantity. When R1 sells the b good from
R2’s package, he earns (αl2 )
2αh−αl
2 =
2αhαl−α2l
4 . The total revenue of
2αhαl
4 never is
larger than the cost α
2
h+α
2
l
4 of buying R2’s vertically-integrated package. A simi-
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lar argument can be made for R2. Each will buy their own vertically-integrated
quantities at a price equivalent to the revenues generated.
Thus, bundling in this case of symmetric demand functions means a complete
elimination in the profits of the retailers, if any were earned prior to bundling.
However, there is some benefit to consumers in the markets with the “weaker”
valuation of the goods. Prior to bundling, only below-vertically-integrated levels
of these goods (a for R1 and b for R2) were available for purchase. After bundling,
the higher vertically-integrated quantities are sold. There are improvements to
consumer welfare as well as overall welfare. The monopolist M sees profits goes
up as he can extract the complete vertically-integrated revenues in both markets
with bundling.
The reduction of retailer profits by way of bundling was mentioned in Shaffer
and O’Brien as was the use of bundling to achieve vertically-integrated quantities.
However, in that paper it was a single monopolist retailer buying substitute goods
from many upstream manufacturers. There, the retailer’s profit diminished when
two manufacturers merged and could offer their goods in a bundle. The retailer
lost his “threat” of buying one of the other substitute goods with bundling and
suffered as a result. In the example above, bundling also eliminates the “threat”
of buying some other package to earn a profit, but in this case, it is the pack-
age of another retailer with the same classes of goods not a package containing
somewhat differentiated types of goods. In some ways, bundling in the above ex-
ample differs from Shaffer and O’Brien in that it seems to make a greater type of
goods available to more retailers even if it is diminishing their profits. So while
profits diminish for retailers and consumer welfare improves through bundling in
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both instances, with Shaffer and O’Brien it is done by removing a single retailer’s
threat to buy alternative goods while here it is done by removing a threat to buy
the same goods sold to other retailers. Perhaps this is a subtle difference but it
shows that the power and effects of bundling could be linked just as much to the
presence of other retailers as much as the presence of the different goods.
2.3.4 Retailer has threat of earning profit
The next natural question involves what happens when the demand functions
are not symmetric. How is consumer welfare impacted? What happens to retailer
profits? Can retailers still earn positive profit even with bundling? To start an-
swering these questions, the demand functions are adjusted for a new example:
pa1(qa1) = αl − qa1 (2.13)
pb1(qb1) = αs − qb1 (2.14)
pa2(qa2) = αh − qa2 (2.15)
pb2(qb2) = αl − qb2 (2.16)
There are obviously numerous possibilities for strength of the parameters. Initially,
let us choose αl = αh2 and αs > αh. The first condition allows neither retailer to
earn a profit prior to bundling as the “weaker" market is too weak for M to find
it worth selling anything to and will thus choose to simply extract the maximum
revenue from the stronger market. The second condition gives R1 a larger overall
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surplus than R2. R1 could in theory potentially profit from buying and reselling
R2’s package from bundling if the strength of its strong good, evidenced by αs is
strong enough. The following example assesses this and looks at whether such a
threat of R1 earning a profit has any effect on consumer welfare or output as well.
As with the single good case, R2 should never earn a profit. To see this,
realize the manufacturer could offer each retailer a package at a price equivalent
to the consumer revenue generated in their market by that package. A retailer’s
ability to earn a profit comes form threatening to buy the other’s package. If both
retailers are earning a profit, then M continues to increase the price at least until
one of the retailers doesn’t profit anymore. If R2 is the one earning a profit by
buying the package intended for R1, the manufacturer can always turn around
and create a case of symmetrically opposite packages and prices where R1 is the
one who earns the profit by threatening to buy R2’s package. M can then do
better by offering R1 a package containing its own vertically-integrated quantities
at the same price and extract the additional surplus, created by R1’s relatively
high demand for the b good creates; this is all done while assuring R1 the same
profit from threatening to buy R2’s package.
How strong does R1’s demand for b need to be for R1 to earn a profit?
At the minimum, R1 should be be able to profit off a package containing R2’s
vertically-integrated quantities even if it’s purchased at the price R2 could resell
this for. (Otherwise,M could just do best by offering each retailer their vertically-
integrated quantities at transfer prices equivalent to the revenue these generate in
each retailer’s market, and extract maximum revenue.) For this condition to hold
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it must be:
(αs − αl2 )(
αl
2 ) + (αl −
αl
2 )(
αl
2 )−
α2l
4 −
α2h
4 ≥ 0 (2.17)
where the first term is whatR1 earns in revenue by sellingR2’s vertically-integrated
quantity of b, the second term is whatR1 earns in revenue by sellingR2’s vertically-
integrated quantity of a (while dumping any excess goods past αl2 ), and where the
last two terms represent the cost of buying R2’s package, which is the revenue
generated by R2’s vertically-integrated quantity. Remembering that αl = αh2 , the
above equation is binding when αs = 5αh4 .
To ensure that R1 can earn at least some profit when buying R2’s vertically-
integrated bundle at the level of revenue this bundle generates, let us suppose that
αs = 4αh3 . Prior to bundling b is only sold to R1 and a is only sold to R2. This
generates a surplus of α2s4 +
α2h
4 =
25α2h
36 , which is entirely extracted by M . In any
arrangement with bundling, M must earn a higher profit than this (and this is
shown below.)
Before proceeding much further, it is instructive to point out that when M
can bundle it has the option of selling either one type of package (which targets
only the retailer with the higher surplus) or two types of packages (targeting the
retailers differently), much as it did in the one-good case. If it sells only one pack-
age to one retailer, it will choose to do so with R1 and charge it the value of its
vertically-integrated level for those same quantities. This package has a value of
1
4(α
2
s + α2l ) =
73α2h
144 ≤
25α2h
36 so clearly M will not offer only one package even with
bundling as such an outcome can never exceed the profit from selling packages to
multiple retailers without bundling. Something will be available for both R1 and
R2 to purchase if bundling is to happen.
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What should the two packages to the retailers look like? R1 should and will
be assured the same profit from each package as otherwise M can continue to
raise the price until R1 is indifferent between them. As mentioned before, M can
charge R2 the price at least up to the revenue its package generates, as to do
otherwise gives profit unnecessarily to R2...as well as R1, whose own hand would
be strengthed by a more affordable package for the other retailer. If R2’s package
will be qa2, qb2 then M should let qa2 = αh2 as this extracts maximum revenue
from R2 but also forces R1 to carry the greatest excess amount of the a good
while still paying for it. This latter point makes R2’s package less attractive to
R1 and diminishes any profit which M must assure him, thereby increasing M ’s
own profit. When it comes to qb2, however, M may actually find it profitable to
reduce this quantity below R2’s vertically-integrated level in order to reduce R1’s
margin on R2’s package in order to entice R1 to buy it’s own vertically-integrated
package. A partial recoupment here of the larger surplus by M may offset any
losses endured by reducing the quantity of qb2 sold to R2.
Accordingly, M seeks to maximize it’s profit from selling the above-described
package to R2 and a package containing R1’s vertically-integrated quantities at a
price which still assures R1 the same profit it gets from buying and reslling R2’s
package. The only choice variable of interest here is qb2 as the others (qa2, qa1 and
qb1) should all be the vertically-integrated ones. M seeks to maximize its profit
expressed as:
(α
2
h
4 )+(αl−qb2)(qb2)+(
α2s
4 )+(
α2l
4 )−((
α2l
4 )+(αs−qb2)(qb2)−(
α2h
4 )−(αl−qb2)(qb2))
(2.18)
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Here the first two terms represent the profit sold from selling R2 its package at a
level equal to the revenue it generates, the second two terms represent the value
of R1’s vertically-integrated package, and the final term in parentheses (which is
subtracted) represents the assured profit R1 gets by threatening to turn around
and buy R2’s package, thus discounting the profit which M can make. Simple
solving of the first-order condition reveals qb2 = 2αl−αs2 , which is the same as the
result in the one-good case whenM limited the quantity sold to one retailer to get
the other retailer to buy more. Inspection of this equation when the parameters
above are inserted indicates qb2 = 0. However, unlike the one-good case, this is
not acceptable or realistic as it means R1’s profit from buying and reselling the
R2 package of (0, αh2 ) is now negative itself.
3
Clearly it is not reasonable to expect that R1 agree to a negative profit so a
non-negativity profit condition must be imposed. M now seeks to maximize its
profit, pim, subject to the condition that R1 earns a non-negative profit. This is
expressed as:
pim = (
α2h
4 ) + (αl − qb2)(qb2) + (
α2s
4 ) + (
α2l
4 )− ((
α2l
4 ) + (αs − qb2)(qb2)− (
α2h
4 )−
(αl − qb2)(qb2)) + λ((αs − qb2)qb2 + α
2
l
4 −
α2h
4 − (αl − qb2)qb2) (2.19)
where the term following λ is the non-negative profit condition, which is the dif-
ference between the revenue R1 receives from buying R2’s package and the cost
of that package to R2. This constraint will bind in this example and we have:
3In fact, it is equal to α
2
l
4 − α
2
h
4 =
−3α2h
4 as R1 dumps most of the a good despite paying for it.
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qb2 = (
α2h
4 −
α2l
4 )(
1
αs − αl ) (2.20)
substituting in αl = αh2 and αs =
4αh
3 , we see that qb2 =
9αh
40 . This is under
αh
4
(or αl2 ), which is R2’s vertically-integrated level of qb2. R1 earns zero profit but
its threat to earn a profit off the b good causes M to reduce the quantity offered
from vertically-integrated levels in the other market. Consumer welfare in R2’s
market improves with bundling as some of this good is now available but it doesn’t
improve all the way to vertically-integrated levels because of the strength of R1’s
demand for this good.
One last thing to show in this example is that M prefers selling bundles of
(qa2 = αh2 , qb2 =
9αh
40 ) to R2 and (qa1 =
αl
2 , qa2 =
αs
2 ) to R1 versus remaining in
a world without bundles. M can charge R2 its complete revenue from selling its
items. In terms of αh this is equal to:
α2h
4 + (
αh
2 −
9αh
40 )(
9αh
40 ) =
499α2h
1600 (2.21)
From R1, M can receive the value of R1’s vertically-integrated package minus the
profit it must assure R1 to not buy R2’s package:
α2s
4 +
α2l
4 − ((αs − qb2)(qb2) +
α2l
4 −
499α2h
1600 ) (2.22)
which in terms of αh is equal to:
4α2h
9 +
α2h
16 − ((
4αh
3 −
9αh
40 )(
9αh
40 ) +
α2h
16 −
499α2h
1600 ) (2.23)
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However, unsurprisingly, this simplifies to (49 +
1
16)α
2
h =
α2s
4 +
α2l
4 , which is just the
revenue from R1’s vertically-integrated package as no profit is given to R1 when
the constraint binds. The total profit to M from both retailers is thus:
α2h(
499
1600 +
4
9 +
1
16) =
11791α2h
14440 (2.24)
This is larger than the 25α
2
h
36 that M earned from selling the goods separately so
M will choose to bundle. Accordingly the following observation can be made:
Observation 1. When bundling under the conditions in this section, more goods
will be sold in each market but the two retailers still do not earn profits. R2’s
consumers suffer sub-vertically-integrated levels of b as a result of R1’s threat to
earn a profit from sales of the b good to its own consumers after R1 has bought
R2’s vertically-integrated package from M .
2.3.5 Implications when a retailer can earn profit even
with bundling
Let us consider some more general demand forms to assess if it is possible if
one of the retailers can earn a profit with bundling and what the implications may
be for consumers, manufacturer and total welfare in this case. Let the demand
functions faced by the retailers now be:
pa1(qa1) = αl − qa1 (2.25)
pb1(qb1) = αh − qb1 (2.26)
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pa2(qa2) = αm − qa2 (2.27)
pb2(qb2) = αn − qb2 (2.28)
where αm > αl and αh > αn. Let the second inequality be larger so R1 has
the larger vertically-integrated surplus and can potentially profit by buying R2’s
vertically-integrated package. M will reduce the quantity of qb2 sold to R2 to
maximize :
pim = (
α2m
4 ) + (αn − qb2)(qb2) + (
α2h
4 ) + (
α2l
4 )− ((
α2l
4 ) + (αh − qb2)(qb2)− (
α2m
4 )−
(αn − qb2)(qb2)) + λ((αh − qb2)qb2 + α
2
l
4 −
α2m
4 − (αn − qb2)qb2) (2.29)
where the term following λ is the non-negative profit condition for R1. The first
two terms represent the revenue from R2’s package, the next two terms represent
the revenue from R1’s vertically-integrated package and the following subtracted
term in parentheses represents the profit whichM must assure R1 to get it to buy
its own vertically-integrated package rather than the package sold to R2.
If the constraint binds then:
qb2 = (
α2m − α2l
4 )(
1
αh − αn ) (2.30)
If the constraint above fails to bind, then M will continue to decrease qb2 until
either qb2 = 2αn−αh2 or until no positive amount of the b good is sold to R1. (The
latter case occurs if αn ≤ αh2 .) Even if positive amount of b are sold to R2, the
quantity 2αn−αh2 is still less than the vertically-integrated quantity of
αn
2 .
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For R1 to earn a profit, the term in (28) must be larger than 2αn−αh2 . The top
term α
2
m−α2l
4 is a measure of R1’s relative weakness in the market for its weaker
good, a. The larger this difference, the more qb2 that M can produce and sell
in a package to R2 as R1’s higher cost of carrying the a good also serves as an
incentive for R1 to not buy R2’s package and dampens the need to restrict the
quantity of b sold to the other market. The bottom term in (28), 1
αh−αn , is an
inverse measure of R1’s relative strength in the market for its stronger good. A
stronger R1 which more easily earns a higher profit requires M to produce less qb2
in order to not make R2’s package so attractive that R1 is not enticed to buy its
own vertically-integrated bundle.
For R1 to earn a profit and for the constraint not to bind it must be that:
2αn − αh
2 >
(α2m − α2l )
4(αh − αn) (2.31)
This occurs when:
6αnαh − 2α2h − 4α2n > α2m − α2l . (2.32)
or when there is a sufficiently-high αh to αn spread relative to a sufficiently-low
αm to αl spread.
Assuming that αn = xαh, for 0 < x < 1, the term on the left above in (30) is
positive whenever 12 < x < 1. Basically for R1 to earn a profit, R1’s demand for b
must be strong but not so strong that M decides it’s better to sell only to R1 and
not to R2. Thus, there is sort of a “Goldilocks-zone" of the parameters for which
R1 can profit. Also, αl must be sufficiently large as to be close to αm. Under these
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conditions, R1 can still earn a profit with bundling. While qb2 = 2αn−αh2 is given
to R2 in a package, this is no different than the quantity that would be given to it
prior to bundling. R1’s ability to earn any positive profit even after bundling here
completely wipes out any gains to consumers that may occur in the other market
as a result of bundling.
Of course, this only happens if M can itself earn a better profit by bundling
than without bundling and chooses to bundle accordingly. The below example
shows that M earns a better profit with bundling for the case where αm = αh,
αn = xαh, and αl = yαh for 12 < x < y < 1. (Eventually, the parameters x =
3
5
and y = 1920 will be used.)
Before bundling, using the parameters chosen above, M will sell positive
quantities of goods to both consumers. The results are obtained from the one-good
case. For good a, M earns α2m2 +α
2
l −αmαl. For good b, M earns α
2
h
2 +α
2
n−αhαn.
With bundling and a quantity of qb2 = 2αn−αh2 sold in R2’s package, insertion
of qb2 into M ’s profit function reveals a profit of α
2
m
2 +
α2h
2 − αnαh + α2n for M .4
Comparison of the two cases reveals that M ’s profit with bundling is larger
by αmαl − α2l than it is without bundling. Thus, M chooses to bundle. The
increase in M ’s profit comes only from the increased sale of the a good to R1.
This explains the presence of parameters only from the a demand functions here.
Letting αm = αh, αn = 3αh5 , and αl =
19αh
20 , we would see that the increase in M ’s
profit is equivalent to 19α
2
h
400 .
After bundling R1 earns a profit equivalent to the value at which in can sell
R2’s package less the cost of purchasing this package (which is the value at which
4Terms with αl drop out completely indicating the relative strength of R1’s “weak" good has
no effect onM ’s profit with bundling although this term does affect the profit without bundling.
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R2 can sell it.) This is:
α2l
4 + (
2αn − αh
2 )(αh −
2αn − αh
2 )−
α2m
4 − (
2αn − αh
2 )(αn −
2αn − αh
2 ) (2.33)
where the first two terms represent R1’s revenue from selling R2’s package and the
second two terms, which are subtracted, represents R2’s revenue from the same
package. This simplifies to:
6αnαh − 2α2h − 4α2n − α2m + α2l
4 (2.34)
which is reminisicent of the profit condition in (30). Again, letting αm = αh,
αn = 3αh5 , and αl =
19αh
20 , this leads to a profit of
α2h
64 for R1. Prior to bundling,
R1 earned profits from the sale of good b of (2αh−αn2 )(αh − αn) =
3αnαh−α2h−2α2n
2 ,
which would be 11α
2
h
50 for the same parameters. Thus, we see that while R1 earns a
profit after bundling it is substantially reduced from what it was before bundling.
Specifically, it decreases by α
2
l−α2h
4 . R2’s profit of
3αlαm−α2m−2α2l
2 from selling a prior
to bundling is wiped out completely. With the chosen parameters, this was only
a more modest level of 9α
2
h
400 considering that R1’s demand for a was allowed to be
close to the same demand R2 faced; this allowed M to only have to restrict R1’s
quantity slightly to entice R2 to buy its own vertically-integrated quantity of the
single good a.
More generally, we could also consider the case where R1 has superior demand
for both goods. Now, αl > αm and αh > αn. Let R2’s demand parameters be
at least 1/2 of those of R1 ensuring that some good is sold in each market prior
to bundling. With bundling, M will again try to maximize its profit and do so
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by charging R2 whatever value it can get from the revenue R2’s package sells
for in its own market but also by offering R1 a vertically-integrated package that
assures it gets the same profit received from buying R2’s package. M will choose
the quantities qa2 and qb2 which are sold in both markets to maximize the profit:
((αm−qa2)(qa2)+(αn−qb2)(qb2)+(α
2
l
4 +
α2h
4 )−((αl−αm)(qa2)+(αh−αn)(qb2)) (2.35)
where the first two terms are the value of R2’s package to R2, the second two
terms are the value of R1’s vertically-integrated package, and the final terms in
the subtracted set of parentheses represent the profit R1 can make by buying R2’s
package. Solving of the first order conditions simply reveal that qa2 = 2αl−αm2 and
qb2 = 2αh−αn2 . These quantities are the same as when goods are sold separately
so bundling allows no increase in the final quantities or consumer welfare if the
retailer has a stronger demand for both goods. This is not surprising as any
increase in quantities by way of bundling came through M ’s increased power to
turn a retailer away from the threat of buying another retailer’s goods by forcing
the retailer earning a profit to buy excess undesirable goods of another type in a
“bundle". Since R1 was already happily buying any quantities of either good that
R2 wished to buy, this power is not gained here and so the equilibrium quantities
remain unchanged.
Accordingly, to sum up this section with an observation:
Observation 2. Improvements in consumer welfare by way of bundling (in this
world with two territorial monopolistic retailers buying nonlinear packages from
one monopolistic manufacturer) seem tied to retailer profit. Specifically, these
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improvements are related to the ability of the retailer in the other market to profit
by buying his counterpart retailer’s goods. The stronger the threat of profiting off
another retailer’s vertically-integrated package of either good, the less the benefit
derived by consumers from bundling in the other market. If the retailer’s threat
of profiting off one of the goods is so strong that he can still earn an overall
profit in the case of bundling, consumer welfare and quantity gains in that good
are eliminated in the other market. If the retailer has stronger demand for both
goods, consumers in all markets generally do no better with bundling than without
although it is still possible they can purchase some level of sub-vertical quantities in
the weaker market. This shows there is a relative relationship between the demand
functions retailers may face and benefits which may accrue to consumers. Strength
in one market can cause repercussions elsewhere.
2.3.6 Three retailer example
One can wonder what happens if there are more territories with more retailers.
Figuring out the different bargains which M may offer the various retailers with
different demand functions can be complex as M must take into account whether
retailers will buy other retailers’ packages. There are also many possible forms
of the heterogeneity in the demand functions and establishing general or, even
tractable, results may be difficult under these circumstances. However, to show
some possibility of what may happen with three retailers, I establish the following
example:
I consider what happens if there are three retailers. I still assume retailers
are local monopolies who face idiosyncratic demand functions for two different
91
goods a and b. The goods are neither complements nor substitutes at this point.
Consider them again to be two unrelated goods. The goods are manufactured by
a single monopolist, who sells to all retailers. (Index the three retailers Ri with
i = 1, 2, 3.) The manufacturer can sell to retailer i packages of the goods (qai, qbi)
at a price T (qai, qbi). The manufacturer M can set the price T of the packages at
any value; there is no linear or other pricing constraint. If there is no “bundling"
allowed, the manufacturer is constrained to offer only packages of types (qai, 0) or
(0, qbi). That is, any positive quantity of a type of good offered in one package
must have zero of the other type of good in the same package. When bundling
is introduced, the quantities of both goods in the package can take on non-zero
numbers.
M will choose packages and prices that maximize total profit. M can make
certain packages unavailable by effectively charging T = ∞ for them. Assume
cost of production is zero for now. M has knowledge of the demand functions that
retailers face for the two goods. They are:
pa1(qa1) = αl − qa1 (2.36)
pb1(qb1) = αh − qb1 (2.37)
pa2(qa2) = αh − qa2 (2.38)
pb2(qb2) = αl − qb2 (2.39)
pa3(qa3) = αm − qa3 (2.40)
pb3(qb3) = αm − qb3 (2.41)
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In this example, let αl = αh/2. (The demand functions above allow for some
convenient symmetry.) Let αm, which is less than αh, be large enough so that R3
would opt to buy the vertically-integrated bundle (or the bundle which extracts
the maximum of R1 or R2’s profits) that is sold to either R1 or R2. Such a bundle
would contain αh/2 of one good and αl/2 of the other. The value to R1 or R2 of this
bundle would be α
2
h+α
2
l
4 . If the manufacturer seeks to maximize surplus extracted
from R1 or R2, then it charges this price for the bundle. R3’s valuation5 of either of
the others’ bundles is α
2
m+2αmαl−α2l
4 . R3 will buy the vertically-integrated package
of the other two retailers if its valuation of their package exceeds their valuation
of it or if:
α2m + αmαh − 3/2α2h > 0 (2.42)
This is true if αm ≥ αh(−1+
√
7)
2 ≈ 0.823αh. Assume this condition holds.
Here, R3 would like to buy R1 or R2’s bundle unless the manufacturer restricts
the quantities in these bundles to make it less favorable to R3. The manufacturer
may find it worthwhile to do this if the lost revenue from restricting the quantites
in packages sold to R1 or R2 can be gained back by having to assure R3 less of a
profit when it presents R3 with its vertically integrated bundle of (αm/2, αm/2).
The manufacturer can offer R3 a package (αm/2, αm/2) at a price equal to the
revenue generated by R3’s sales of the items in this package minus the profit R3
receives from buying one of the other two bundles. (R3 would be willing to buy
this package.) In choosing the quantities of the low and high valuation goods to
5These revenues are obtained by putting in quantities of αm2 for one good and
αl
2 for the
other into the revenue functions. Remember R3 dumps any quantity past αm2 so even though it
buys a package which includes αh2 of a other good, it will not sell this quantity.
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sell to R1 and R2, M seeks to maximize:
2(qh(αh − qh) + ql(αl − ql)) + (α2m/4 + α2m/4)− (α2m/4 + ql(αm − ql)−
(qh(αh − qh) + ql(αl − ql))) (2.43)
with respect to qh and ql. Here qh is the quantity of the high valued good sold to
each retailer and ql is the quantity of the low valued good sold to each retailer. The
first term in the parentheses (following the “2") is revenue that could be generated
from a bundle sold to either R1 or R2. M will charge these retailers this amount
for this bundle since it has nothing to lose by not doing so. The second term in
parentheses is the revenue generated by R3’s vertically integrated bundle. The
third term in parentheses is profit R3 can generate by purchasing and reselling
either R1 or R2’s bundle. The above equation makes use of the reverse symmetry
of the demand functions for R1 and R2. The manufacturer has an incentive to
lower ql simultaneously on each bundle for R1 and R2. If this were not the case, R3
could simply opt to buy the package with the higher ql to earn the largest profit.
The manufacturer must transform each of R1 and R2’s bundles into an equally
less profitable option in order to have any deterrence on R3’s “threat" to buy the
other retailers’ bundles. Above, the manufacturer will earn 2 times the revenue
from one of the symmetric bundles sold to R1 or R2 plus additional profit gained
by selling R3 his producer surplus maximizing bundle (αm/2, αm/2) at a price that
assures him the profit from buying one of the other bundles. The term α2m/4 is
present as R3 never sells more than its producer surplus maximizing quantity.
The f.o.c.’s here yield qh = αh2 and ql =
3αl−αm
4 . Note that the quantity of ql is
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higher than in the two retailer case. R3 is able to play off the two other retailers
better than if just one other retailer were present; this is because the manufac-
turer can earn more profit from two retailers with low valuations of the different
goods than if there were just one such retailer. This lessens the manufacturer’s
necessity to limit the amounts of the low valuation goods it sells in the packages
to R1 or R2 in order to reduce the profit it must assure R3. Here R3’s revenue6
from buying either the package of R1 or R2 is 18αmαl−9α
2
l−α2m
16 . The revenue to R1
or R2 is 4α
2
H+3α
2
L+2αmαl−α2m
16 . The former exceeds the latter if αm ≥ 7αh8 . This is
the condition for R3 making a positive profit on buying the bundle of either R1 or
R2. Assume this holds.
Before bundling was allowed, the manufacturer had to sell the goods sepa-
rately. Consider how good b should be priced in this case. M could choose to sell
only to R1, who had the highest value. He could have chosen to sell to R1 and R3,
who had the two highest valuations. Or he could have sold to all of R1, R2 and
R3. If he sold to R2, who had the lowest value, he would seek to need to assure the
other retailers the same profit as if they bought R2’s package in order to get them
to buy any other quantity. Because the other retailers have such a large potential
producer surplus relative to R2 it can be shown he chooses not to sell to R2 as it
would cut into his extraction of these other surpluses (since R1 and R3 would just
go ahead and buy R2’s package instead). Specifically, if M opted to sell to R2, he
would seek to maximize:
3(qb2(αl − qb2) + (α2h/4 + α2m/4)− (qb2(αh − qb2) + qb2(αm − qb2)) (2.44)
6These revenues are obtained by putting in quantities of αm2 for one good and
3αl−αm
4 for the
other into the revenue functions. Remember that R3 dumps any quantity past αm2 again.
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with respect to qb2. The first term in parentheses (after the “3")is revenue that
can be generated and extracted from R2. The second term in parentheses reflects
revenue generated by selling vertically integrated quantities to R1 and R3. The
last term in parentheses is revenue that R1 and R3 can get by selling R2’s quantity.
(The “3" simplifies the fact that R1 and R3 also want to buy R2’s bundle and are
willing to do so.) The equation takes into account the revenue that can be gained
by selling to R2 versus assured profit to the other retailers. First order conditions
show that qb2 = 3αl−αh−αm2 . If αm + αh is greater than 3αl, then M does best by
not choosing to sell any positive quantity to R2. This condition would hold for the
cases above in which R3 earns a profit in the event of bundling, where αm ≥ 7αh8 .
At this point, with R2 receiving nothing, we are back to the two-retailer case
without bundling. Since αm > αh2 , M won’t sell only to R1 but rather to both R1
and R3. To maximize profit for the market for good b, M only sells to R1 and
R3. Now the manufacturer must consider what happens if R1 chooses to buy R3’s
quantity of b. As in the previous cases, the manufacturer will seek to sell R3 some
quantity qb3 of b which is less than R3’s vertically integrated quantity to limit the
profit R1 can earn. Specifically, M seeks to maximize:
2(qb3(αm − qb3)) + (α2h/4)− qb3(αh − qb3) (2.45)
with respect to qb3, the quantity of b offered to R3. Here, qb3 = 2αm−αh2 , which is a
familiar quantity. It is sold to R3 at the price equal to the revenue that quantity
generates for him. M eventually offers R1 his vertically integrated quantity of αh2
for b at a price equal to the revenue that quantity generates for him minus the
profit that he can earn by buying R3’s package of b.96
Since αm > αh/2 a positive quantity will still be sold to R3 and some profit
assured to R1. However, R3’s revenue is completely extracted by M in the b
market. M simply charges R3 the revenue that his quantity of b generates. Since
the same story can be told for R3 and R2 in the a market, we conclude that R3
earns no profit prior to bundling. Yet, after bundling is introduced, R3 is the
only retailer that earns a profit. In this example, the retailers which earned a
profit prior to bundling no longer do so afterwards; whereas the retailer who earns
nothing before bundling, earns something after bundling.7
This section can be summarized with the following observation:
Observation 3. In this example with three retailers, the retailers which earn or do
not earn profit can flip with bundling. This is another example of how bundling can
not just affect manufacturer, product output, and consumer welfare but can also
have direct effects on the profitability of the retailer. A single retailers’ interest in
bundling could be aligned with that of the manufacturer and consumers but against
those of other retailers in certain cases. Consumer welfare improves (weakly)
through bundling, as usual with the two retailer case. (This can be seen by simply
noting that consumers in the low valuation markets are now able to buy some
positive amount of these goods with bundling and consumers in R3’s market also get
to buy more of both of these goods with bundling.) Vertically-integrated quantities
still aren’t obtained for the lower valued goods in R1 and R2 due to the desire of the
manufacturer to protect itself against R3’s threat to buy these retailer’s packages
yet the quantities in these markets are higher nonetheless than before bundling.
Overall, social welfare increases through bundling here; consumers, manufacturers
7This all assumes of course thatM earns more bundling than not bundling and thus willingly
bundles. This is shown in the appendix and is actually true for all positive αm in the range of
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and R3 benefit. R1 and R2 see profits diminish.
2.4 Conclusion
Given all that has been said in this paper what are the main things to take away
about manufacturer bundling in the face of retailer heterogeneity? First, it seems
that the presence of the retailers and the ability of the manufacturer to offer
flexible non-linear packages when bundling weakly allows more product to be pro-
duced and sold. Bundling allows manufacturers to have more control in extracting
surplus and offering packages which approach vertically-integrated quantities by
making certain packages tailored to one retailer less attractive to another. The re-
duction in alternatives for the retailers gives the manufacturer greater bargaining
power. In Shaffer and O’Brien, this was done by forcing the single retailer to buy
extra goods. Here, the addition of extra retailers seems to strengthen this power.
As vertically-integrated quantities are approached, consumers do benefit as, prior
to bundling, manufacturers may have been restricting the quantities offered to one
retailer in order to assure less profit to another, especially in a world where all
packages are available to all retailers. The introduction of bundling of an unprof-
itable good allows another tool apart from quantity restriction to extract surplus
from retailers by forcing them to buy other packages.
Interestingly, here a retailer’s ability to earn a profit in a two-good, two-
retailer case seems tied to the ability of bundling to improve consumer welfare
in a different market when the same terms of price and quantity must be offered
to all retailers. If a retailer can still profit after being forced to buy some other,
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less-profitable goods when attempting to buy another retailer’s package, the man-
ufacturer will revert to restricting the quantity of the profitable good as it did
with the one-good case prior to bundling. This is because the higher margin with
which this retailer can sell the profitable good in a retailer’s package causes him
to need an assured profit in any deal and, as this cuts into the producer’s own
profit, this may lead to quantity restrictions in packages sold to the other retailer.
The parameters for which this is possible seems to require that the “unprofitable"
good be not too unprofitable and the “profitable" good have a moderate margin.
It was shown that too high a margin on the “profitable" good will prevent it from
being offered to a competitor. This eliminates a retailer’s threat of making a profit
by buying the other’s package. However, too low a margin may not be enough to
overcome the unprofitability of a bundled good. The interplay of the markets for
the two goods was examined using crude demand functions but it is believed that
more complex demand functions would not model the relative strengths of the
demands much differently; this seems especially true since the monopolist manu-
facturer is pricing non-linearly and can pick the optimal quantity for itself with
any demand function.
The case with three retailers shows, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, that some
retailers may do better with bundling even when the bundle contains excess goods
which are unprofitable and may be dumped. This seems to happen for a certain
set of parameters where one retailer finds it again not-too unprofitable to carry
the undesireable good (where αm = 7αh8 ) and substantially profitable to carry
the desirable one (where αm = 7αl4 ). The fact that this effect is so strong that
some retailers could go from having profits before bundling to losing them with
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bundling and that another could earn no profit without bundling but earn one
with it was unexpected and surprising. This may have anti-trust implications. If
retailers in certain territories can profit with bundling or with mergers that result
in bundling, they may have reason to pool their legal resources with upstream
parties in insisting on such practices.
The way in which bundling may affect the fortunes of retailers and consumers
is complex and this paper only looks at a subset of cases to determine some possible
effects. Including more goods or more retailers, allowing the retailers to directly
compete, enabling manufacturers to have competition, looking at firm entry and
exit, and including the possibility of goods as substitutes or complements would
enhance the model but also potentially greatly complicate it. In offering deals to
the retailers, the manufacturer in this paper needed to consider how other retail-
ers would respond under the realisitic legal assumption that the same terms must
be offered to each party. Complicating the model further makes consideration of
these terms perhaps untractable. This paper at least ponders the case of bundling
when there is some retailer heterogeneity without the added complexities that may
alter, enhance or muddle the results. While it is not the last word on bundling, it
can add to what is already understood about it.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof Manufacturer Earns More Profit with Bundling
in the Three-Retailer example
Without bundling, M sells each good to the two retailers with the two highest
valuations of the product. For good b, these are R1 and R3. Using results from
section 3.2 when there is just a single good sold to two retailers, we see that M ’s
profit from selling separate packages of b to R1 and R3 is:
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α2h − 2αhαm + 2α2m
2 (2.46)
Since there is also the a good, and as R2’s demand for a is the same as
R1’s demand for b,M can earn an identical profit as above by selling a to both R2
and R3. Thus, without bundling, M ’s total profit is double that of the previous
equation:
2α2h − 4αhαm + 4α2m
2 (2.47)
Using the value αm = 7αh8 , we have a total profit for M of
25α2h
32 when there is
no bundling.
To determine M ’s profit with bundling, we use equation (2.43) and enter
the profit maximizing quantities found in section 3.6. These are qh = αh2 and
ql = 3αl−αm4 . Inserting these into (41) gives M a profit of:
3(4α2h + 3α2l + 2αmαl − α2m)
16 +
α2m
4 −
18αmαl − 5α2m − 9α2l
16 (2.48)
Remembering again that αl = αh2 and αm =
7αh
8 , this simplifies to
66α2h − 24αmαh + 24α2m
64 =
4056α2h
4096 =
507α2h
512 (2.49)
As this exceeds 25α
2
h
32 , M chooses to bundle in the example in section 3.6 as it
is more profitable.
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